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Precedent and Dialogue in Investment
Treaty Arbitration
Richard C. Chen*
Since the turn of the century, investment treaty arbitration (“ITA”) tribunals have begun citing past
decisions with increasing frequency. They do so despite the absence of any formal doctrine of stare decisis
and the presence of structural obstacles to the use of precedent in this context. Scholarship in this area has
focused on explaining the rise of this de facto doctrine of precedent and evaluating the merits of the practice.
Few have grappled with more practical questions about how precedent should operate in this unique sphere,
but an examination of ITA decisions reveals that some order and discipline are needed if the practice is to
continue.
This Article is the first to offer a detailed framework to guide ITA tribunals in the practice of
precedent. It does so from the dual standpoints of applying precedent (how much deference is owed) and
authoring precedent (how broadly or narrowly to write). The framework is designed to help tribunals at
each stage balance the three key values of predictability, accuracy, and legitimacy that any system of
precedent is expected to serve. That balancing should be conducted in light of the distinctive institutional
features that make ITA different from common law systems. At a high level, the proposal is to replace the
common law approach of stable, incremental decision making with a model of robust and contentious
dialogue. In this dialogue, tribunals should view past decisions skeptically and, in writing their own
decisions, seek not just to resolve the immediate dispute at hand but to advance the broader conversation of
which each case forms one part.
Introduction
The use of precedent in investment treaty arbitration (“ITA”) presents a
puzzle. The treaties themselves do not provide for a doctrine of stare decisis,1
which is the idea that courts should “stand by things decided and not dis-
turb settled points.”2 Certain structural characteristics of the ITA regime
cast further doubt on whether precedent can play a useful role in the process.
In particular, there is the lack of continuity and hierarchy: each tribunal is
constituted to resolve a single dispute, and there is no appellate mechanism
to police decisions for correctness and coherence.3 Moreover, the substantive
law that the tribunals are shaping through precedent is fragmented, coming
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. For helpful comments and discus-
sions, I am grateful to Julian Arato, Marco Basile, Simon Batifort, Ben Heath, Charles Norchi, Esther
Yoo, and participants in workshops at the University of Maine School of Law and the 2017 American
Society of International Law Research Forum at Washington University School of Law.
1. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 Arb. Int’l 357,
368–69 (2007).
2. Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 841 (3d ed. 2011).
3. See Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 418, 426, 450–51 (2013).
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not from a single multilateral treaty but instead from thousands of invest-
ment treaties that are similar in content but nonetheless formally distinct.4
Despite these formal and structural obstacles, investment tribunals began
citing past awards and decisions5 as precedent in the late 1990s, right
around the time that the number of arbitrations began to grow.6 Practition-
ers have noted that earlier arbitrations tended to focus on the language of
the treaties because there were few past decisions to discuss.7 But as the
number of arbitrations increased, it soon became routine for lawyers to cite
prior arbitral decisions in support of their arguments and for tribunals to
discuss them in their reasoning.8
For the past decade, scholarship in this area has grappled with two main
questions: why this practice of citing precedent arose and whether it is a
good thing. The primary explanation is that the treaty terms at issue are
vague, so it is only natural that tribunals would take into account past ef-
forts to interpret the same or similar provisions.9 As for assessments of the
practice, most have been favorable, noting that use of precedent increases
predictability and enhances the legitimacy of the system.10 Notably, even
commentators who have expressed skepticism about these benefits seem to
accept that the continued use of some form of precedent is likely
inevitable.11
This Article seeks to shift the conversation to a question that has received
comparatively little attention: how precedent should operate in this unique
sphere. If we accept that the practice of precedent is now fairly entrenched
and almost certain to continue in some form, we should give more thought
to what objectives precedent is serving and how tribunals can best achieve
those objectives. In short, how can the practice of precedent be optimized?
In answering this question, this Article proposes breaking out the two
components of the practice—applying precedent and authoring it—for sep-
arate analysis. Consider first how tribunals apply past decisions. There cur-
rently exists a range of views and practices regarding how much deference is
4. See id. at 425.
5. The term “award” is usually used to describe a final determination on the merits. Written determi-
nations on preliminary matters, such as jurisdiction, are referred to as “decisions.” Since both awards and
decisions could be cited as precedent, I will use the latter term with the understanding that it includes
both preliminary and final determinations.
6. See Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 24 J. Int’l Arb. 129, 149
(2007); see also Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C.
L. Rev. 1, 46–47 (2007) (documenting the increase in awards issued between 1990 and the first half of
2006).
7. See Lucy Reed, The De Facto Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case
Management, 25 ICSID Rev.–Foreign Inv. L.J. 95, 97 (2010) (describing the author’s experience repre-
senting clients in early arbitrations, in which arguments were “focus[ed] directly on the relevant treaty
language and underlying principles”).
8. See Commission, supra note 6, at 149. R
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See infra Section I.B.
11. See Cate, supra note 3, at 472. R
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owed.12 Do tribunals have an obligation to promote consistency? Should
they wait until a consistent line of cases has reached the same conclusion
before deferring? Or should past decisions be considered as persuasive au-
thority only? The practice of precedent aims to improve the predictability of
the ITA system, yet the absence of any framework to govern how precedent
is used makes that goal impossible to achieve.13
A less appreciated but equally important part of the practice of precedent
concerns the writing of the decision. For the system to function effectively,
tribunals need to be conscious of their roles in authoring precedent and not
only in applying it.14 The question of how to approach the authoring task
has received less attention, and views that have been expressed are relatively
uniform: commentators and the tribunals themselves generally agree that
disputes should be decided narrowly.15 But what tribunals actually do in
practice is another story. Sometimes they confine themselves to the narrow
facts of the case, but often they offer broader reasoning, beyond what is
necessary to resolve the dispute at hand.16 Again, a more disciplined ap-
proach is needed.
This Article offers a detailed framework for addressing all these ques-
tions—at the application stage, how much deference tribunals should afford
to past decisions, and at the authoring stage, how broadly or narrowly tribu-
nals should write their decisions. Rather than proposing a single answer to
these questions, I argue that tribunals should decide in each case which
course will best promote the several values that a system of precedent is
supposed to serve: predictability, accuracy, and legitimacy.17 The task there-
fore is to determine the optimal means for achieving those goals and how
they should be balanced when they are in tension with each other.
An initial step in developing a useful framework is to recognize the dis-
tinctive institutional characteristics of ITA. Consider first how precedent
works in the context of common law systems, where the practice originated.
12. See infra Section III.C.1.
13. See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 Ford. Int’l L.J.
1014, 1046–47 (2006).
14. In prior work, along with two coauthors, I adopted a similar lens in analyzing the role of U.S.
courts in authoring precedent. See Paul J. Watford, Richard C. Chen & Marco Basile, Crafting Precedent,
131 Harv. L. Rev. 543, 544–45 (2017) (reviewing Bryan Garner et al., The Law of Judicial
Precedent (2016)).
15. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Bo¨ckstiegel, Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different Are They
Today?, 28 Arb. Int’l 577, 588 (2012).
16. For example, as described in Sections IV.B and IV.C below, tribunals have often reasoned broadly
about the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment provision and narrowly about the potential inter-
action between human rights and investment treaties.
17. The significance of these values was evident in the discussions of a Working Group of states that
was recently convened by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law to discuss poten-
tial ITA reforms. See U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, Working Group III, Possible Re-
form of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Consistency and Related Matters, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.III/WP.150 (Aug. 28, 2018). Although not focused on the issue of precedent, one report following
the most recent Working Group session underscored the fundamental importance of values like predict-
ability, “correctness,” and legitimacy to the international investment law regime. Id. at ¶ 28.
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The default position of common law courts is to resolve disputes narrowly
and allow broader rules to take shape in an incremental process as each case
adds to the one before it.18 That process manages to promote predictability
because courts are bound by stare decisis. Thus, even if a modest decision
leaves unresolved questions, one can at least be confident that later courts
will strive for consistency and not lightly choose to reverse course entirely.
Moreover, a common law system’s court of last resort further enhances pre-
dictability by providing broader guidance when needed in the form of a
general rule or governing framework. The presence of a high court is also
key to preserving accuracy, not only in the short-term sense of reversing
incorrect decisions but in the longer-term sense of having the authority to
provide a course correction when a line of decisions proves to be misguided.
The institutional differences between common law courts and ITA tribu-
nals mean that the latter cannot take the approach of the former and expect
the same results to follow.19 Because ITA lacks stare decisis and a court of
last resort, I argue that, in lieu of a piecemeal approach that prizes stability
and continuity, precedent in the ITA context should function as a robust
and contentious dialogue.20
At the application stage, that means taking a skeptical view rather than
deferring to past decisions. In the absence of a stare decisis norm, any indi-
vidual decision to defer will necessarily be ad hoc and thus fail to promote
any meaningful predictability. And if tribunals did develop a strong pre-
sumption of deference, that would trigger serious accuracy concerns because
the first tribunal to decide an issue could set the law off in a flawed direc-
tion, with no high court available to reverse the tide. The proposed dialectic
model strikes the right balance between predictability and accuracy by en-
18. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 195–96 (2d ed. 2009).
19. Notably, these features are familiar to participants in and observers of the ITA system, but their
implications for the practice of precedent are not yet well understood. For example, Commission correctly
observes that “it is essential at this stage to examine the impact of [the emerging practice of ITA
precedent] on the continued operation of such a system without a hierarchical structure or rule of binding
precedent.” Commission, supra note 6, at 154. But later in that same article, he suggests that “invest- R
ment treaty tribunals and those appearing before them as counsel are not always as faithful to traditional
common law techniques of reasoning as could be desired.” Id. at 156. My contention is that distinctive
features of the ITA system mean traditional common law approaches are not always appropriate.
20. Other commentators have suggested that ITA tribunals should develop the law through dialogue
or a dialectic process, but they see this as an alternative to, rather than a way to conceptualize, a system of
precedent. See, e.g., Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 Va. J. Int’l
L. 545, 571–72 (2014); Cate, supra note 3, at 451. For both Arato and Cate, the main point is that past R
decisions should be considered only insofar as their reasoning is persuasive. See Arato, supra note 20, at
574–75; Cate, supra note 3, at 467–68. As explained in the main text, this Article provides a more R
nuanced framework for applying past decisions as well as for authoring new precedents. There is also a
more general literature studying how national courts and international tribunals are engaged in a trans-
national judicial dialogue about the content of international law or the meaning of shared constitutional
norms. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue
in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487, 492–97 (2005). Because my project is
focused on the particular institutional features of ITA, the scholarship on judicial dialogue more gener-
ally has less relevance here.
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couraging tribunals to actively debate an issue until a genuine consensus
forms as to the best answer.
At the authoring stage, the dialectic model encourages tribunals to reason
and write with an eye toward how their decisions fit into the larger dia-
logue. That may mean a willingness to reason and write more broadly, to
test ideas that later tribunals can accept, reject, or modify. For the competi-
tion of ideas to be effective, tribunals cannot always produce fact-bound
decisions that resolve only the narrow dispute at hand. Instead, they must
engage with each other at a higher level of generality. In combination with a
norm of skepticism toward past decisions, the use of broad reasoning facili-
tates the path toward genuine consensus and ultimately produces the au-
thoritative guidance that, in a common law system, only a court of last
resort could provide.
The precise approach a tribunal should take in any given dispute requires
an individualized assessment of how best to advance the values of predict-
ability, accuracy, and legitimacy, which may present tradeoffs in particular
circumstances. For example, sensitivity to the concerns of accuracy and legit-
imacy may require tribunals to reason more modestly, allowing the issues to
take shape over the course of a series of disputes before venturing any
broader pronouncements. Likewise, once a genuine consensus has formed,
predictability may trump accuracy, as tribunals should be less willing to
disrupt settled expectations in the pursuit of a purportedly sounder solution.
The framework developed in this Article is intended to help tribunals recog-
nize where a given dispute fits into a larger dialogue and what implications
that has for how they should approach their task.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a more detailed overview
of the existing literature on precedent in ITA. It describes the evolution of
the practice and how commentators have explained its rise. Part II describes
three key values that any system of precedent is expected to serve—predict-
ability, accuracy, and legitimacy—and explains what they mean in the ITA
context specifically.
Part III turns to the question of how precedent should operate if the goal
is to promote those key values. It begins by highlighting how ITA differs
from common law systems and explaining how those distinctions should
shape the approach taken by tribunals. At a high level, this means tribunals
should approach their task as engagement in a dialogue instead of the stable,
piecemeal decision making process used by common law courts. After ex-
plaining the concept of precedent as a dialectic process, Part III develops a
more detailed framework to guide tribunals. I divide the framework into the
two roles in which tribunals engage with precedent—application and crea-
tion—and suggest how tribunals can best promote the three key values as
well as balance them when they are in tension.
Part IV illustrates my proposed approach with several examples. Some-
times tribunals did precisely what my framework would have recommended,
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and other times they did not. But either way, there is little evidence that
they proceeded as they did based on an adequate evaluation of how their
analysis fit into a broader system of precedent. The goal of this Article is to
supply the principled framework that tribunals presently lack.
Finally, although the focus of this Article is on how precedent can best
promote dialogue among tribunals, it is worth remembering that the larger
conversation involves states, investors, nongovernmental organizations, and
other affected members of the public. As others have noted, international
adjudicatory bodies have the capacity to generate useful public deliberation
about the content of legal rights.21 Understanding how those dynamics play
out in the ITA context will have to await further research, but as a general
matter, the proposed steps for facilitating dialogue among tribunals should
help advance the larger public conversation as well.
I. The Rise of Precedent in ITA
A. A Brief Overview
This Section provides a brief history of ITA—it has been chronicled ex-
tensively elsewhere22—and an introduction to how precedent has been used
in this setting. ITA was created to give foreign investors a neutral forum in
which to challenge the conduct of host states. The most popular arbitral
institution is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”), which is part of the World Bank.23 The ICSID Convention pro-
vides a framework for the conduct of proceedings,24 and states that join it
agree to recognize awards as “binding and final and not subject to review
except under the narrow conditions provided by the Convention itself.”25
The parties to a dispute must consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction, and for states
that typically occurs when each party to a bilateral investment treaty
(“BIT”) agrees in advance to arbitration for claims brought by investors
from the other state.26 The foreign investor, in turn, consents by filing a
request for arbitration, thereby initiating the dispute.27
21. See Shai Dothan, International Courts Improve Public Deliberation, 39 Mich. J. Int’l L. 217, 218–19
(2018).
22. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Ford. L. Rev. 1521, 1536–45 (2005).
23. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law
238 (2d ed. 2012). Other widely used institutions include the International Chamber of Commerce and
London Court of International Arbitration. Id. at 241.
24. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
25. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 239. R
26. Id. at 13, 238.
27. Id. at 258.
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The ICSID Convention came into force in 1966, and the first dispute was
filed in 1972.28 But investor-state arbitration did not really take off until
around the turn of the century.29 To give an idea of the increase: “In 1995
there were four ICSID arbitrations pending and in summer 2012 about 150
cases were pending.”30 As the number of cases increased dramatically, so too
did the practice of citing past decisions rise significantly. One 2007 study
on citation practice in ICSID shows that, until 1994, the number of ICSID
precedents cited per ICSID decision was about two; between 1994 and
2002, the average number was between two and four; and between 2002 and
2006, the average number was about ten.31 When that study was conducted,
there were 151 publicly available ICSID decisions.32 Today that number is
closer to 650.33 As the number of available decisions continues to grow,
tribunals have more decisions to draw on or otherwise account for on any
given issue. Thus, since the 2007 study, the rate of citation is likely to have
at least held steady, if not increased even more.
Beyond this quantitative analysis, there is also the question of how prece-
dents are actually being used. In domestic legal scholarship, the different
possible uses of precedent are sometimes characterized as a sliding scale of
deference.34 At one end of the spectrum is binding precedent, which a court
is obligated to apply without any discretion.35 At the other end of the spec-
trum is persuasive authority, which a court will follow only to the extent its
reasoning is convincing.36 In between those two extremes are different de-
grees of deference. A modest form of deference would treat precedent as a
tiebreaker, meaning that it will be followed when the competing arguments
present a close case that could go either way. A more robust form of defer-
ence would mean that a precedent will be followed unless there are compel-
ling reasons to depart from it. This is often how the high court in a common
law system treats its own precedents.37
In the ITA context, we know that one extreme—treating arbitral prece-
dents as binding—is off the table. Most tribunals that have discussed their
use of precedent seem to conclude that it is entitled to only persuasive au-
thority or a fairly modest amount of deference.38 I return to the question of
28. Id. at 239.
29. See Franck, supra note 6, at 46. R
30. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 239. R
31. Commission, supra note 6, at 149–50. R
32. Id. at 132.
33. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Cases, Advanced Search, https://
perma.cc/55AG-4ELJ.
34. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel: Studying the
Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156, 1161–62 (2005); see also Zachary Douglas, Can a Doctrine of
Precedent Be Justified in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 25 ICSID Rev.–Foreign Inv. L.J. 104, 104 (2010)
(using the term “sliding scale” in the ITA context).
35. Lindquist & Cross, supra note 34, at 1161. R
36. Id. at 1162.
37. See Bryan Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 35 (2016).
38. See infra Section III.C.1.
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how tribunals are applying precedents, as well as how they should be, in
Section III.C.1 below. The next Section addresses how the scholarly commu-
nity has explained the rise of precedent in ITA.
B. Existing Understandings of ITA Precedent
The starting point for understanding the status of ITA precedent is to
underscore that there is no formal basis for it. Neither the substantive in-
vestment treaties nor the procedural rules in the ICSID Convention provide
for stare decisis.39 Indeed, some have read Article 53 of the ICSID Conven-
tion, which provides that arbitral awards “shall be binding on the parties,”40
as precluding any doctrine of precedent, at least in the stricter sense of bind-
ing authority.41 Moreover, the ICSID Convention does not identify past ar-
bitral awards as one of the enumerated valid sources of authority.42
Even so, there is an argument that tribunals may properly treat past
awards as a relevant consideration. The ICSID Convention directs tribunals
to apply “rules of international law.”43 Under the authoritative hierarchy of
sources of international law provided in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”), “judicial decisions” do not have the force of law—
that is reserved for treaties, custom, and general principles of law.44 Further,
the ICJ Statute provides that the ICJ’s own decisions have “no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”45 The
Statute does, however, identify “judicial decisions,” along with scholarly
writings, as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”46
Moreover, the ICJ cites its own decisions and those of arbitral tribunals for
precedential guidance in a manner that resembles how common law courts
cite case law.47 Thus, even if arbitral awards do not have formal status in the
way that common law court decisions do, this concern has not prevented the
39. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 368–69. R
40. ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 53(1). R
41. Commission, supra note 6, at 142 (citing Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A R
Commentary 1082 (2001)). But see Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 368 (criticizing this as an uncon- R
vincing “basis to deny the existence of any form of precedent in this field”).
42. The relevant provision states:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Con-
tracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable.
ICSID Convention, supra note 24, art. 42(1). R
43. Id.
44. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans
1179.
45. Id. art. 59.
46. Id. art. 38(1).
47. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in Interna-
tional Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline 265, 266–68 (Colin Picker et al.
eds., 2008).
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ICJ from developing a system of precedent and probably should not pose an
obstacle in the ITA context either.48
Apart from these formal considerations, there are also practical reasons
why precedent fits awkwardly in the structure of ITA. First, there is no
institutional continuity. Each tribunal is created anew, with arbitrators se-
lected by the parties for the sole purpose of resolving their specific dispute.49
The arbitrators therefore lack the incentive to promote the coherent develop-
ment of the law that a system with a more stable set of actors generally
has.50 Second, there is no hierarchy. That means not only that there is no
appellate court to ensure uniformity by reversing wrong decisions, but also
that there is no authority to say which view is correct in the first place.51
Third, the substantive law is fragmented, codified across thousands of trea-
ties, most of them bilateral. While investment treaty provisions are often
very similar, there is variation in the language, and there may be differences
in the negotiation history that are relevant to the interpretation process.52
This complicates any effort to rely on precedent interpreting one treaty in a
later dispute about a similarly worded provision in a separate treaty.53
Despite these practical obstacles, the citation of past decisions now ap-
pears to be routine. Commentators offer a simple, common-sense explana-
tion: the treaty provisions at issue are vague, so it is helpful to know how
other tribunals have given them content.54 Applying broad concepts like fair
and equitable treatment might entail more discretion than tribunals feel
comfortable exercising. The ability to point to earlier decisions narrows that
discretion and allows tribunals to offer a more reasoned analysis.55
48. See id.; J. Romesh Weeramantry, The Future Role of Past Awards in Investment Arbitration, 25 ICSID
Rev.–Foreign Inv. L.J. 111, 123 (2010).
49. See Cate, supra note 3, at 450. R
50. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 28. This point should not be overstated, however. R
Although there is no standing court, parties frequently choose from a select group in making their
appointments, so that “a relatively small college of elite arbitrators play an outsized role in the system,
giving the field more coherence than it might otherwise have.” Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel,
The Evolution of International Arbitration: Judicialization, Governance, Legitimacy 72
(2017).
51. See Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. Int’l
L. & Pol. 1109, 1110 (2012) (noting that appellate courts in domestic legal systems serve the two
separate but related functions of “error correction and lawmaking”). ICSID decisions are subject to an-
nulment by an ad hoc committee, but the available grounds are very narrow. See Dolzer & Schreuer,
supra note 23, at 301–04. R
52. See Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, Conversations Across Cases—Is There a Doctrine of
Precedent in Investment Arbitration?, 5 Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt. 3, 6 (2008) (“[I]dentical or similar provi-
sions of different treaties may not necessarily yield the same interpretative results once differences in the
respective context, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and travaux pre´paratoires have been
taken into account.”).
53. There are many examples suggesting that tribunals do not pay close attention to subtle differences
and often treat similar terms as identical. See, e.g., Section IV.A.
54. See Reed, supra note 7, at 96–97; Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law R
Agency, 53 Harv. Int’l L.J. 391, 427 (2012).
55. See Douglas, supra note 34, at 106; Judith Gill Q.C., Is There a Special Role for Precedent in Investment R
Arbitration?, 25 ICSID Rev.–Foreign Inv. L.J. 87, 87 (2010).
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Comparing ITA to other arbitration systems reveals similar insights. As
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, a leading arbitrator, puts it, “the less devel-
oped the body of rules is, the more important the role of the dispute resolver
will be with respect to the creation of rules.”56 She points out that the need
for precedent is greater in ITA than in commercial arbitration, where there
is generally a well-developed body of domestic law to apply.57 Mark
Weidemaier similarly describes arbitral precedent as serving a “gap-filling
function.”58 In the context of foreign investment, “there is only a thin body
of state-supplied law,” meaning content that is “supplied by public actors
like courts and legislatures.”59 Contrast that to, for example, the field of
employment arbitration, where “courts remain active in interpreting the
statutes that govern employment relationships, and they regularly produce
the contract and tort law that underlies nonstatutory employment dis-
putes.”60 In such a setting, a system of arbitral precedent would seem not
only unnecessary, but potentially improper because tribunals would be seen
as usurping the role of courts, which have greater legitimacy to develop the
law.61
Weidemaier provides a further explanation that serves as a bridge to Part
II. The conditions described above probably do not make a system of arbitral
precedent inevitable; the relevant actors still must be motivated to produce
it, and preexisting norms may pose an obstacle.62 The actors in the ITA
context were in fact motivated to use precedent to increase the predictability
of the system and thereby promote its long-term legitimacy.63 Part II elabo-
rates on these and other values that the system of precedent is supposed to
serve.
*  *  *
As the preceding discussion showed, the use of precedent in ITA appears
to be entrenched. Despite formal and practical barriers, lawyers and arbitra-
tors began citing precedent because they needed a way to ground the mean-
ing of the vague provisions they were charged with interpreting. But in the
absence of any guiding framework, the practice of precedent in ITA is un-
disciplined. The remainder of this Article develops such a framework to
assist ITA tribunals in their task of applying and creating precedent.
56. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 375. R
57. See id.
58. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1895, 1928–29 (2010).
59. Id. at 1928.
60. Id. at 1948.
61. See id. at 1947–49.
62. That has been the case with securities arbitration, which Weidemaier describes as having resisted
developing a practice of precedent despite sharing certain features with ITA, “because the norms in
securities arbitration have disfavored reasoned awards.” See id. at 1955–57.
63. See Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 1944–47. R
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II. The Values Served by Precedent
Apart from the general goal of facilitating more reasoned decision mak-
ing, what other values is a system of precedent supposed to serve? In other
regimes, courts use precedent with an eye toward predictability, accuracy,
and legitimacy concerns.64 Commentators in the ITA context have generally
focused on these same objectives, though, as discussed below, their precise
meaning must be adapted to the needs and characteristics of this particular
regime.65
Other values, such as efficiency and equality, are also sometimes cited as
benefits of precedent in general and in the ITA setting in particular. Use of
precedent increases efficiency in that it allows adjudicators to rely on past
decisions and not have to address previously settled questions anew.66 It
promotes equality in that a fair system should treat like cases alike.67 These
values are apt insofar as they describe system-level benefits that would fol-
low from the effective practice of precedent in ITA. But I bracket them for
present purposes because they do not add anything to the operational ques-
tions on which this Article is focused. They are sufficiently incorporated in
the other values—an efficient and fair system will also be predictable, accu-
rate, and legitimate—that it would be redundant to address them
separately.
The remainder of this Part defines the values of predictability, accuracy,
and legitimacy and explains how tribunals may use precedent to promote
them. It concludes with a discussion of how a minority view has criticized
the practice of precedent in ITA.
A. Predictability
The value of predictability is perhaps best underscored by Justice Bran-
deis’s observation that “in most matters it is more important that [the ques-
64. Commentators have identified a range of values served by precedent. The three I focus on, along
with efficiency and equality, which I discuss briefly below, are fairly standard. For example, Deborah
Hellman cites “protecting liberty, equality, stability, predictability, and legitimacy” as pertinent values.
Deborah Hellman, An Epistemic Defense of Precedent, in Precedent in the United States Supreme
Court 63, 63–64 (Christoph J. Peters ed., 2013). She then offers an “epistemic defense of precedential
reasoning” that corresponds to what I mean by accuracy. Id. at 65. Jeremy Waldron offers a longer list:
“importance of stability, respect for established expectations, decisional efficiency, the orderly develop-
ment of the law, Burkean deference to ancestral wisdom, formal or comparative justice, fairness, commu-
nity, integrity, the moral importance of treating like cases alike, and the political desirability of
disciplining our judges and reducing any opportunity for judicial activism.” Jeremy Waldron, Stare
Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2012). At least some of these
concepts overlap and could be consolidated into the five I have emphasized.
65. I bracket the question of precisely what should fall within the ITA system I am describing. It
suffices for present purposes to say that many participants acknowledge their connection to a larger
international investment community that cuts across individual investment treaties and arbitral
institutions.
66. Garner et al., supra note 37, at 10. R
67. Cate, supra note 3, at 448. R
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tion] be settled than that it be settled right.”68 Whether a given answer is
correct or not, a settled rule allows people to plan their affairs with a better
understanding of potential legal consequences.69 A system that relies on pre-
cedent facilitates such planning by enabling people to better predict the
outcomes of potential disputes with “reasonable confidence” and conduct
themselves accordingly.70 In this sense, predictability is often discussed in
connection with protecting reliance.71 Departing from precedent is disfa-
vored because it disrupts the “legitimate expectations of those who live
under the law.”72
Reliance concerns may be heightened in the context of investment treaties
in particular. While predictability is desirable in any environment, it has
been recognized as fundamental to investment treaties and their goal of pro-
moting the flow of capital.73 Unlike other actors in the general public, for-
eign investors may be present in a host state precisely because they have
been promised a stable legal framework.74 Although these assurances typi-
cally relate to a host state’s domestic legal environment, the same concerns
would seem to apply to the interpretation of treaty commitments.75 Foreign
investors desire clarity regarding the scope of treaty protections just as they
do regarding the content of domestic regulations, so that they can plan their
affairs accordingly.
Given these concerns, it is not surprising that tribunals have justified
their use of precedent based largely on predictability. As one tribunal put it,
“cautious reliance on certain principles developed in a number of those
cases, as persuasive authority, may advance the body of law, which in turn
may serve predictability in the interest of both investors and host States.”76
B. Accuracy
Accuracy in the context of adjudication must be defined with reference to
the applicable law. In ITA, the investment treaty is the primary source of
law. When a treaty speaks directly to an issue, there is no doubt what con-
68. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
69. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 597 (1987). A predictable system also
promotes the rule of law by conveying that decisions are being decided according to neutral principles. I
discuss this aspect of predictability in connection with legitimacy below.
70. Id. at 597 n.53 (distinguishing between predictability and certainty).
71. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 Emory L.J. 1459, 1465 (2013).
72. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
73. See Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 179,
197–98 (2005).
74. I discuss this view, and its limitations, in connection with the fair and equitable provision stan-
dard in Section IV.B below.
75. See Kalb, supra note 73, at 197. R
76. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Tribunal,
¶ 293 (Oct. 2, 2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\60-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 13 22-FEB-19 14:27
2019 / Precedent and Dialogue 59
stitutes an accurate or correct answer: the parties’ express intent must
govern.77
Often, however, it is impossible to say what the “right” answer is. As
noted earlier, most bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) contain vague pro-
visions susceptible to numerous interpretations.78 In such circumstances,
tribunals generally attempt to be faithful to the “object and purpose” of the
treaty,79 but in filling in gaps, they inevitably exercise some discretion to
make law in the way that common law courts do.80 Accuracy in that context
means fashioning a workable rule that produces sensible results in later
cases.81
The fact that there are rarely clear answers is key to understanding how
precedent fosters accuracy in decision making. Adherence to precedent
means drawing on the collective wisdom of earlier decision makers. When
there is no objectively “right” answer but only better and worse solutions,
the individual judge is likely to produce better results by following the
collective wisdom rather than her own intuitions.82 Although the collective
wisdom will turn out to be misguided from time to time, the content of the
law as a whole is likely to be better in the long run when a system of
precedent is in place.83
That brings us to the first and most fundamental tradeoff that precedent
presents. When precedent seems generally sound, predictability and accu-
racy point in the same direction. But when precedent proves to be mis-
guided, it serves as an obstacle to accuracy, and the question becomes
whether disruption is warranted. It may be, as Justice Brandeis believed,
that the value of predictability trumps the value of accuracy in most circum-
stances, but implicit in his statement is that there are at least some matters
77. See Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, 33
Mich. J. Int’l L. 537, 573–75 (2012). When there is a conflict between the text and apparent subjective
intent, the answer is more complicated. See id. at 573–74. As Andrea Bjorklund notes, party intent is not
actually a proper basis of interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but it is
nonetheless regularly consulted. Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Enduring but Unwelcome Role of Party Intent in
Treaty Interpretation, 112 AJIL Unbound 44, 44 (2018). I bracket this debate and note only that, in
referring hereinafter to state intent as a basis of interpretation, I leave open the question of whether that
means subjective intent or only objective intent, as evidenced by the text and the object and purpose of
the treaty.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 54–55. R
79. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
80. See Yackee, supra note 54, at 413; see also Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: R
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1995) (describing how
common law courts make law both in traditional common law cases and in filling gaps in constitutional
and statutory provisions).
81. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27
Del. J. Corp. L. 499, 517 (2002).
82. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 9–10; see also Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: R
Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 3–23 (1999).
83. Hellman, supra note 64, at 65. R
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in which it is more important to be accurate.84 To that dilemma I would add
the following complication: should a tribunal’s willingness to depart from
precedent differ depending on whether the purported error is a misinterpre-
tation of state intent or merely misguided from a practical perspective? I
attempt to offer some guidance on these questions in Section III.C.1 below.
C. Legitimacy
The third value tribunals need to consider when engaging with precedent
is legitimacy. A legitimate adjudicatory body is “one whose authority is
perceived as justified.”85 Legitimacy may be evidenced by the willingness of
parties to submit their disputes to a particular body and to comply with its
rulings.86 Since the long-term viability of ITA tribunals depends on how
their constituencies perceive them, legitimacy may be the most important of
the three considerations.87
Commentators have identified a range of factors that go into determining
the legitimacy of international adjudicatory bodies. Many of these factors do
not relate to the practice of precedent and so will be set aside for present
purposes.88 Another factor—the quality of reasoning—is directly linked to
precedent, in that reliance on precedent provides a basis for neutral, ordered
decision making.89 But apart from providing a reason in favor of using pre-
cedent, this aspect of legitimacy does not add anything to the operational
framework being developed here.
Legitimacy is also often associated with the values of predictability and
accuracy. More specifically, predictability and legitimacy are linked through
the concept of the rule of law: a system that is predictable and produces
coherent and consistent case law garners legitimacy because it bears the
hallmarks of the rule of law, with outcomes being decided based upon neu-
84. Schauer, supra note 69, at 598. R
85. Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicatory Bodies, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
107, 115 (2009).
86. See id. at 116–18.
87. See Cheng, supra note 13, at 1026 (“[B]ecause arbitration is a privately-sponsored system, its R
continued growth and existence depends on the global community believing that it is legitimate.”).
88. For example, procedural fairness is often cited as a component of legitimacy, but that relates
primarily to the conduct of proceedings and not the application or authoring of precedent. See Grossman,
supra note 85, at 124. R
89. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudi-
cation, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 319 (1997) (describing how “[a]dherence to precedent, even when used only as
authoritative guidepost and not as binding obligation,” contributes to perceptions of quality and there-
fore legitimacy); Weidemaier, supra note 58, at 1946 (noting how engagement with precedent “signals R
that the decision resulted from a deliberative, systematic process, rather than from an ad hoc balancing of
the equities in a particular case”); cf. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality, and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50
Years of the New York Convention: ICAA Congress Series No. 14, at 5, 51 (Albert Jan van den
Berg ed., 2009) (criticizing the use of “ ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it’-type of reasoning” by ITA tribunals).
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tral principles.90 Writing in the ITA context, Kaufmann-Kohler contends
that predictability is an essential element of any system that aspires to the
rule of law.91 She therefore concludes that even absent “a legal obligation to
follow precedents . . . it seems well settled that [arbitrators] have a moral
obligation to follow precedents so as to foster a normative environment that
is predictable.”92
At the same time, accuracy is also essential to legitimacy because flawed
decisions, particularly as they accrue over time, can likewise undermine the
rule of law.93 That is because participants in the system care about the sub-
stantive content of the law and not only the process used to get there.94
Thus, as tribunals decide whether to correct an established but flawed line of
cases, broader considerations about legitimacy may strengthen the case for
departing from precedent beyond what accuracy concerns alone would
dictate.
To this point, legitimacy as a consideration merely adds a gloss on what
we knew from the preceding two sections. But there is another dimension of
the legitimacy factor, which could be described as a concern about the
proper role of the tribunal. In other words, even if a decision strikes the
appropriate balance between predictability and accuracy in applying past
decisions and crafting new guidance for later tribunals, one could separately
question whether that decision exceeded the proper scope of the tribunal’s
authority based on state consent.95 In particular, because tribunals have not
been explicitly delegated the power to make law, there are plausible grounds
on which to criticize decisions that defer to the reasoning of past cases or
attempt to articulate broader principles beyond what was needed to decide
the dispute at hand.
This is, to some extent, a legitimacy concern that any adjudicatory body
must face, particularly in the early stages of its existence, as the scope of its
authority is being refined.96 But this concern is heightened in the ITA con-
90. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 10; see also Franck, supra note 22, at 1584 (describing the R
legitimacy of ITA as in part dependent on the extent to which it promotes predictability and the rule of
law).
91. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at 374 (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38–39 R
(rev. ed. 1969)).
92. Id.
93. See Randy J. Kozel, Settled versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 Tex. L.
Rev. 1843, 1862 (2013) (noting that “[e]xcessive deference to flawed constitutional precedents can also
threaten to create systemic concerns for the rule of law”).
94. See Cheng, supra note 13, at 1019; Grossman, supra note 85, at 115 (noting that an international R
court’s legitimacy depends in part on whether it is “interpreting and applying norms consistent with
what states believe the law is or should be”).
95. See D. Brian King & Rahim Moloo, International Arbitrators as Lawmakers, 46 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. &
Pol. 875, 889–90 (2014).
96. The International Criminal Court, for example, has from its inception faced questions about its
legitimacy. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discre-
tion at the International Criminal Court, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 510, 510–11 (2003); Margaret M. deGuzman,
Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 Ford. Int’l L.J. 1400, 1435–38 (2009).
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text not only because of the uncertainty surrounding the tribunals’ lawmak-
ing role, but also because of their status as privately appointed international
arbitrators. In comparison to domestic courts, or even international courts
with permanent members, ITA tribunals face more skepticism about their
legitimacy to decide matters of public concern.97 If that is true at the level of
the individual case, the skepticism is likely to be that much higher when
tribunals purport to develop the law of international investment more
generally.98
The foregoing concerns do not necessarily mean that ITA tribunals must
shrink from their lawmaking role to avoid weakening their legitimacy.
Rather, they should simply exercise caution and pay due attention to the
context in which they are operating at a particular moment. Yuval Shany
describes how international tribunals possess “legitimacy capital” that may
vary over time based on reactions to their performance.99 He suggests that as
their capital increases, international tribunals may be willing to issue
“bolder decisions.”100 Their ability to author such bold decisions may, in
turn, further increase their legitimacy, resulting in a “virtuous cycle[ ].”101
In calibrating how to apply and author precedent, ITA tribunals may need
to begin modestly, but Shany’s argument suggests that there is room to
increase their lawmaking role as their legitimacy capital rises.
D. Critiques
Several skeptics have pushed back on whether precedent has actually pro-
duced predictability and legitimacy and whether those are goals worth pur-
suing.102 But perhaps the strongest critique has come from Irene Ten Cate,
who makes the claim that a system of precedent is affirmatively harmful “to
the interests of parties to specific disputes and the investment community at
large.”103 Her argument is, first of all, that goals like predictability and
legitimacy have “diminished force” in the ITA context, such that any pur-
ported benefits of a system of precedent are overstated.104 Further, a system
that gives “weight to consistency” produces costs in the form of sacrifices to
97. See Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 471, 475 (2009).
98. See Yackee, supra note 54, at 416–17. R
99. Yuval Shany, Stronger Together? Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts as Mutually Rein-
forcing or Undermining Notions, in Legitimacy and International Courts 354, 360 (Nienke Grossman
et al. eds., 2018).
100. Id. What Shany means by bold is that a tribunal may be more willing to tackle “deep-seated
injustices caused by structural social problems.” Id. But presumably the same logic would apply to a
tribunal’s greater willingness to issue a broadly reasoned decision.
101. Id.; see also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 89, at 314–15 (describing how the European Court of R
Justice benefited from “incrementalism and awareness of political boundaries” in increasing its legiti-
macy over time).
102. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 34, at 107–10. R
103. Cate, supra note 3, at 422. R
104. Id.
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accuracy, sincerity, and transparency.105 She therefore concludes that tribu-
nals should not give any deference to earlier decisions, even when they form
a consistent line of cases, though she accepts the use of precedent in the form
of persuasive authority.106
Cate’s views and mine are not diametrically opposed in the sense that I do
not make any blanket arguments about how tribunals should engage with
precedent. But her arguments require a response because, if she is correct
that predictability and legitimacy are entitled to minimal weight and accu-
racy is entitled to nearly controlling weight, then there would be little point
in my effort to balance the three values in a more nuanced manner in Part
III.
An initial point about accuracy can be made quickly. Cate’s arguments
about the importance of accuracy overlook the distinction I drew earlier re-
garding cases that have objectively right answers and those that do not.107
When a case has an objectively right answer, most would probably agree
that pursuing accuracy is paramount. But in most difficult cases, interpret-
ing the treaty does not produce a right answer, and the challenge is to iden-
tify the best solution based on practical concerns. In those circumstances,
precedent will often be an aid rather than an obstacle to accuracy.
My more significant critique relates to an implicit normative assumption
underlying her cost-benefit analysis. In short, Cate argues that ITA is at
bottom a dispute resolution system and nothing more. Arbitrators are not
“taking part in a joint endeavor similar to the way judges do,” but are more
like appointed agents of the parties tasked with resolving a discrete dispute
between them.108 Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel call this the “contrac-
tual model,” which understands the arbitrators’ authority as “issuing from
an act of delegation to which the parties have freely consented.”109 That
authority is “limited to the domain of activity governed by the contract,”
105. Id. at 422–23. The costs to accuracy have already been addressed above. As for sincerity and
transparency, the basic point is that reliance on precedent may mask the true reasoning on which tribu-
nals are basing their decisions. See id. at 460–65.
106. Id. at 477.
107. See id. at 458–59 (making several references to the “right” decision and “what the law
requires”).
108. Cate, supra note 3, at 459. A related objection, even assuming ITA should be understood as a R
coherent system, is that tribunals should not seek to advance system values directly. Rather, they, like
any adjudicatory body, should focus solely on resolving disputes, and by doing so effectively they can
hope to serve other useful “social functions” indirectly. David D. Caron, Fifth Annual Charles N. Brower
Lecture on International Dispute Resolution: The Multiple Functions of International Courts and the Singular Task
of the Adjudicator, 111 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 231, 234 (2017). Although that argument might have
force in regard to established systems, others have shown the value of self-conscious efforts by newer
bodies to improve their effectiveness more broadly. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 89, at 277 (describ- R
ing the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights as “partial architects of their
own success”). Further, on the specific subject of whether and how to use precedent, the relative newness
of ITA means that tribunals cannot avoid such meta-questions about how disputes should be decided. In
other words, tribunals cannot focus solely on resolving disputes while the norms of what constitutes
proper reasoning are still being worked out.
109. Stone Sweet & Grisel, supra note 50, at 26. R
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and any law that is made in the act of interpretation “applies only to a
discrete dispute involving a pre-existing contract.”110
The contractual model is, of course, one possible understanding of ITA,
but Cate does not grapple with alternative conceptions of the arbitral role.111
In particular, other scholars, including but not limited to Stone Sweet and
Grisel, contend that ITA is moving, or has already moved, toward a broader
understanding of the arbitral role. Under the “judicial model,” arbitrators
owe a duty “not only to the parties in dispute, but to the arbitral system and
the transnational community they serve.”112 In practice, this duty requires
that tribunals look not only to resolve the immediate dispute before them,
but also to develop procedures and practices with the broader goal of “en-
hancing the effectiveness and autonomy of the arbitral order as a legal sys-
tem in itself.”113 Unlike their counterparts in the contractual model,
tribunals in the judicial model are delegated some prospective lawmaking
authority.114
Stone Sweet and Grisel conclude that ITA falls within the judicial model,
and a range of other observers as well as experienced arbitrators have ex-
pressed concordant views.115 The very fact that arbitrators and counsel are
citing precedent with increasing frequency is a strong indication that par-
ticipants in ITA understand themselves to be part of a larger enterprise.
Moreover, the states themselves have arguably acquiesced to a lawmaking
role for arbitrators. Despite murmurs of broader discontent, there has not
been any widespread denunciation either of ITA in its evolved form or of the
substantive international investment rules that the ITA system helped to
110. Id.
111. In arguing that legitimacy is not worth dwelling on, Cate says “[i]t is not impossible to try to
develop investment law into something that more closely resembles a ‘system,’ but this approach is in
tension with the dynamic and fragmented nature of the field.” Cate, supra note 3, at 456. Cate’s argu- R
ment overlooks the growing convergence that other commentators have observed and advocated for. See
Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law 364–69
(2009) (arguing that international investment law, despite being codified across thousands of individual
BITs, functions in practice like a multilateral system). Indeed, the practice of precedent is one effort to
establish a more coherent system. Thus, Cate’s argument has a circular quality: she rejects legitimacy as a
rationale for adopting a doctrine of precedent because there is no “system” that is in need of legitimacy,
but she ignores that one of the goals of such a doctrine is to help establish that very system.
112. Stone Sweet & Grisel, supra note 50, at 28. R
113. Id.
114. See id. at 219.
115. See id. at 219–20; Dolores Bentolila, Arbitrators as Lawmakers 134–36, 151 (2017);
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb., Award, ¶ 6 (June 8, 2009) (“A case-
specific mandate is not license to ignore systemic implications. To the contrary, it arguably makes it all
the more important that each tribunal renders its case-specific decision with sensitivity to the position of
future tribunals and an awareness of other systemic implications.”). Stone Sweet and Grisel describe a
third model, the “pluralist-constitutional model,” that looks beyond “the internal development of inter-
national arbitration as a legal system in its own right” to “how the arbitral order interacts with other
legal regimes, externally as it were, in processes of transnational governance.” Stone Sweet & Grisel,
supra note 50, at 30. They see evidence that ITA is evolving toward that next phase. Id. at 74–75. In any R
event, their argument that ITA has evolved beyond the pure contractual model, if correct, would suffice
as a rebuttal to Cate’s analysis.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\60-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 19 22-FEB-19 14:27
2019 / Precedent and Dialogue 65
produce. Quite the opposite: states have tinkered at the margins, adding
language here and there to clarify their intentions, and in doing so seem to
endorse the regime’s fundamental premises.116 To be sure, individual states
have withdrawn from ICSID or repudiated their BITs,117 but that again only
serves to highlight the apparent staying power of the regime as a whole.118
None of this is to suggest that the judicial model could not be upended if
states chose to pursue more radical revisions.119 Moreover, I do not want to
overstate the consensus that the judicial model is appropriate. As I discussed
in the preceding Section, tribunals may face pushback on legitimacy
grounds if they pursue their lawmaking role too aggressively.
But the key point for immediate purposes is that, to the extent that ITA
tribunals have evolved or are evolving toward the judicial model, Cate’s cal-
culations would not hold. Values like predictability and legitimacy take on
increased importance, and accuracy, while always a significant consideration,
is not an automatic trump card. Part III outlines how these values should be
balanced at the ground level in the ongoing practice of precedent.
III. Optimizing the Practice of Precedent
How should tribunals engage with precedent to best serve predictability,
accuracy, and legitimacy? Section III.A begins by describing how precedent
operates in common law systems and how such systems balance predictabil-
ity and accuracy using an incremental approach. Section III.B then explains
why those same practices do not translate well to the ITA context in light of
differences in institutional characteristics and suggests how a dialectic pro-
cess could better achieve those two objectives. In these two sections, I do not
focus on legitimacy as a distinct consideration. That is because, in seeking to
stay within the legitimate bounds of their authority, ITA tribunals face the
same basic challenge as common law courts, so legitimacy has less bearing
on the problem of translating practices.
116. See Stone Sweet & Grisel, supra note 50, at 233–34 (noting that “when states have considered R
departures from the standard template for BITs, the more radical proposals have been removed or di-
luted,” and “only marginal adjustments” are actually made); Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment
Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality, 42 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 4 (2017) (conducting an
empirical study of how states react to arbitral jurisprudence and finding that states “fine-tune existing
treaty commitments in light of legal developments, investing in the gradual adjustment of the field
rather than its reinvention”).
117. Stone Sweet & Grisel, supra note 50, at 77–78. R
118. Stone Sweet and Grisel studied new BITs signed between 2002 and 2015 and found “no support
for the view that the regime has generated ‘backlash’ in any systemic sense.” Id. at 212. Instead, they
found, “(a) states continue to negotiate and sign investment treaties; (b) the mix of treaty protections on
offer has remained remarkably stable; and (c) what states have mostly done is to consolidate the system in
line with how arbitrators have, in fact, developed it in their awards on liability.” Id.
119. See id. at 236 (noting that “if even a handful of powerful states converged on preferences to
remake the regime in some fundamental way, they would very likely succeed”).
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After Section III.B describes the dialectic process at a high level, Section
III.C develops a more detailed framework to guide tribunals at the two
stages in which they engage with precedent: at the back end, when applying
decisions, and the front end, when authoring them.
A. The Common Law Approach
Most readers will be familiar with the basic features of common law rea-
soning, so the focus here will be on how those features promote predictabil-
ity and accuracy. Common law reasoning is characterized by incremental
and stable decision making. Principles are refined over the course of a series
of cases, as new fact patterns and experience help to clarify the appropriate
contours.120 Courts tend to decide disputes narrowly to preserve flexibility,
rather than locking themselves into overly broad pronouncements.121 Under
the doctrine of stare decisis, lower courts are bound by the decisions of
higher courts in the same jurisdiction, and higher courts that have the au-
thority to overrule their own past decisions do so only in rare circum-
stances.122 Further, even when there is no binding authority on point, courts
try to extend the law in a coherent fashion. And when a previously articu-
lated rule leads to a problematic result in a new case, courts will often try to
distinguish rather than overrule it. This approach preserves a sense of stabil-
ity even as the original rule has evolved.123
Benjamin Cardozo described the piecemeal process as follows:
The implications of a decision may in the beginning be equivocal.
New cases by commentary and exposition extract the essence. At
last there emerges a rule or principle which becomes a datum, a
point of departure, from which new lines will be run, from which
new courses will be measured. Sometimes the rule or principle is
found to have been formulated too narrowly or too broadly, and
has to be reframed.124
The common law approach strikes a delicate balance between predictabil-
ity and accuracy, and these values are dependent on the doctrine of stare
120. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 23 (1921) (noting that the
common law “method is inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars”).
121. See Raz, supra note 18, at 196. R
122. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 27, 35. R
123. See id. at 99 (“To distinguish, then, a court will usually articulate a new condition, justified on
its own terms, one that preserves the former rule while separating it from the current case. The old
decision is retained (unlike in the process of overruling) but separated from (and so deemed not to
control) the current case.”); see also id. at 97–102 (describing the choice between distinguishing and
overruling a precedent).
124. Cardozo, supra note 120, at 48; see also Munroe Smith, Jurisprudence 21 (1909), cited in R
Cardozo, supra note 120, at 23 (“The rules and principles of case law have never been treated as final R
truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, the courts
of justice. Every new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result
which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.”).
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decisis and the presence of a high court to serve as final arbiter.125 Of course,
the outcomes of individual cases are never completely certain even in the
most mature legal systems.126 A predictable system is simply one in which it
is possible to identify a substantial body of settled law and to know that
settled issues will not be lightly reopened. Further, even when novel ques-
tions arise in such a system, the range of potential answers is circumscribed
because courts will attempt to develop the law in a coherent manner rather
than veering off in unforeseen directions. Stare decisis is an essential compo-
nent in this system because it disciplines courts to adhere to earlier decisions
and depart only rarely and gradually. Likewise, the presence of a high court
helps to enforce that discipline as well as to resolve inconsistencies or clarify
the law when a pool of narrow decisions has become muddled, and some
broader synthesis is needed.
Those same characteristics are key to promoting accuracy as well. As
noted earlier, precedent fosters accuracy by requiring judges to adhere to the
collective wisdom rather than straying off on their own. In that sense, stare
decisis likely improves the quality of decision making in the long run, even
as it precludes individual judges from pursuing their version of the best
answer in any particular case.127 Common law systems also depend on their
hierarchical court structure to promote accuracy. Appellate courts are availa-
ble to correct mistaken decisions, and lower courts, knowing they are sub-
ject to review, will tend to apply the law faithfully. Moreover, the presence
of a court of last resort also promotes accuracy at a deeper level by providing
a safeguard when a more fundamental course correction is needed. The incre-
mental process is designed to keep courts modest, but over time a series of
even minor misguided choices or simple path dependence may bring the law
to an untenable position.128 In such scenarios, a high court with the power
to speak authoritatively is needed to shift the law onto a better path.
125. The paradigm described here is the hierarchical structure of a single jurisdiction, such as an
individual U.S. state. Of course, in the larger U.S. legal system, each state sits on the same horizontal
plane as the others and has the final say on its own law. Because decisions of a state’s high court are
binding within the state but not on others, the interaction between states functions much like the
dialogue I propose here, in which different approaches may be tested and debated. See Shirley S. Abra-
hamson, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1146 (1985) (studying criminal
procedure decisions in the early twentieth century and finding “a dynamic vertical and horizontal feder-
alism, that is, a continuing exchange of legal thought between the Supreme Court and state courts, and a
dialogue among the various states’ courts”); see also Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (en banc) (“State courts have the opportunity to experiment with constitutional rights and
lay potential guidelines for future constitutional decisions of not only state courts but the Supreme Court
as well.”). Similar exchanges may take place among federal circuit courts and district courts on issues not
yet decided by the Supreme Court. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1994).
126. See Schauer, supra note 69, at 597 n.53 (distinguishing between predictability and certainty). R
127. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 9–10; Sunstein, supra note 82, at 3–23. R
128. For an example of “a line of cases in which a rule was extended incrementally until it was tacitly
transformed in its application,” see Garner et al., supra note 37, at 93–96. R
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B. Shifting to a Dialectic Model
Tribunals and commentators often assume that they should approach pre-
cedent in ITA from the same standpoint as common law courts do.129 But
the absence of stare decisis and a hierarchical structure in ITA fundamen-
tally changes the challenge facing arbitral tribunals. In the absence of stare
decisis, no individual decision is entitled to be treated with any respect, let
alone as binding authority. Likewise, in the absence of hierarchy, there is no
final arbiter to resolve inconsistent decisions and bind later tribunals to an
authoritative interpretation. In such a setting, any individual tribunal’s
choice to defer to an earlier decision will be necessarily ad hoc, making any
sense of predictability impossible to achieve.
The inevitable inconsistency in such a system also detracts from accuracy
insofar as there is no coherent set of past decisions embodying a collective
wisdom for tribunals to draw on. Moreover, any effort to address these con-
cerns by creating a strong norm of deference would create a separate risk to
decision making accuracy. That is because too much weight would be placed
on the decision of the first tribunal to encounter an issue. If there is no high
court with the authority to reverse course, the risk of allowing a bad decision
to become entrenched is too great. Thus, if precedent is to serve the values of
predictability and accuracy effectively in the ITA context, tribunals cannot
simply import the practices and assumptions of common law courts
wholesale.
I argue that, in lieu of the incrementalism and stability prized by com-
mon law systems, ITA tribunals should conceive of their roles as participants
in a contentious dialogue about the meaning of investment treaty provi-
sions. That means, at the application stage, being actively skeptical of prior
decisions to avoid the risk of a premature consensus that will be difficult to
undo in the absence of a high court.130 And at the authoring stage, it means
considering how a case fits into the broader discussion and being willing, in
129. Fre´de´ric Sourgens makes the most direct argument in favor of an analogy to the common law.
He contends that, like common law courts, ITA tribunals develop the rules of international investment
law through an inductive process, refining the meaning of treaty provisions as new cases present them-
selves for resolution. See Fre´de´ric G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law on Investment
Protection as Common Law, 34 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 181, 224–31 (2014). Sourgens’s primary objective
is to offer a new theoretical explanation for the status of arbitral decisions that avoids “the structural and
normative problems encountered by the currently predominant theories of international investment law.”
Id. at 187. He is not as focused, as this Article is, on the ground-level practice of precedent, and what he
does say is largely consistent with points I make here. For example, he recognizes that it would not be
sensible to import any doctrine of binding precedent into ITA because it lacks a hierarchical structure.
See id. at 240.
130. For example, the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines critically examined a prior decision regarding the
interpretation of an umbrella clause (in short, whether a contractual breach can be elevated into a treaty
violation) and reached the opposite conclusion even after acknowledging the value of consistency in ITA
jurisprudence. See SGS Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 97, 113–29 (Jan. 29, 2004).
The tribunal further noted that “there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve
issues for all later tribunals.” Id. ¶ 97.
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the right circumstances, to offer more general reasoning to advance the
dialogue.131
This dialectic process better serves the goals of predictability and accuracy
within the institutional limits of ITA. First, it ensures that general rules are
actually being produced. In a system with no high court, there is a risk that
a rigid insistence on incrementalism will produce a large pool of fact-bound
decisions.132 Individual tribunals should recognize that the responsibility
falls on them to offer a broader synthesis or articulation when the time is
ripe, and while no one tribunal’s statement will be authoritative, it can at
least serve to move the conversation forward.
Second, a dialectic process expedites the building of consensus. Because
no one tribunal can speak authoritatively on an issue, any sense of predict-
ability depends upon a critical mass of tribunals converging on an answer.133
This consensus might eventually emerge even in a world of incrementalism,
but the process would be much less efficient if tribunals always gave only
the narrowest reasons for their decisions. If consensus is the goal, each tribu-
nal should take a broader perspective on the issues before it and be prepared
to actively debate potential solutions rather than passively waiting for an
answer to reveal itself.
Third, the proposed model provides a safeguard against errors. If tribunals
reflexively defer to earlier decisions, the danger is that any apparent consen-
sus would be artificial, with arbitrators converging not around the best an-
swers but around the first ones given.134 If instead each tribunal views earlier
decisions skeptically, and consensus develops following a robust debate
among independent minds, the resulting answer is likely to be better as a
result of that process.
Finally, the proposed model promotes accuracy in a different sense, by
inviting a response from states when they disagree with the understanding
that tribunals have converged upon. As noted earlier, the ultimate touch-
stone of accuracy in ITA is the intent of the contracting states. Others have
observed that renegotiating BITs is a costly process and does not happen
very often.135 Moreover, there is a high degree of path dependence in inter-
131. For example, the tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina helpfully addressed the broader question of how
human rights should interact with investment treaty obligations, despite concluding that the host state’s
reliance on human rights was misplaced in this case. See Urbaser SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶¶ 1200–04, 1208 (Dec. 8, 2016). I discuss Urbaser further in Section IV.C
below.
132. See Watford et al., supra note 14, at 578 (describing an example of an area in which the case law R
was “extensive yet disconnected” until the New York high court synthesized the cases into a more
general rule).
133. As discussed in Section IV.B below, tribunals have converged on a common understanding of
certain aspects of the fair and equitable treatment standard. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 1, at R
372–73.
134. See Andrea J. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 Penn. St. L.
Rev. 1269, 1295 (2009) (“Assigning too great a role to any one decision could lead to the establishment
of norms that might soon be viewed as undesirable.”).
135. See Cheng, supra note 13, at 1022. R
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national investment law, as new BITs tend to recycle the provisions of ear-
lier ones.136 States do undertake major revisions from time to time, but the
point is that they are likely to do so only when there is a clear and important
departure from their preferred course.137 A contentious dialogue that pro-
duces a settled understanding gives states a clear answer that they can evalu-
ate and respond to if needed. By contrast, a series of incremental decisions
may never produce a settled answer, or at least it will take much longer to
get to the same place.
The preceding discussion is not meant to suggest that deference to earlier
decisions is never appropriate or that broad pronouncements are always
proper. The point rather is that stability and incrementalism should not be
treated reflexively as the norm the way that common law systems treat
them. The next two sections provide more nuanced guidance on when ap-
plying tribunals should defer to past decisions and when authoring tribunals
should reason broadly, taking into account the values of predictability, accu-
racy, and legitimacy.
C. Implementing the Dialectic Model
This Section develops a more detailed framework for implementing the
proposed dialectic model. I divide the discussion according to the two dis-
tinct roles in which ITA tribunals engage with precedent: applying deci-
sions and authoring them.
1. Applying Precedent
There is an active debate about the proper approach to applying prece-
dents and in particular how much, if any, deference to afford them. As previ-
ously noted, the concept of formally binding precedent is off the table, and
it is difficult to find anyone arguing for a strong degree of deference. Nor
has anyone gone to the opposite extreme and suggested that past decisions
should be entirely ignored even for their persuasive value. That leaves three
main approaches that are part of the ongoing debate.
First, some commentators and arbitrators believe a modest amount of def-
erence to past decisions is warranted. In practice, that means there is a
thumb on the scale in favor of following the earlier decision or decisions,
such that there needs to be a good reason to depart. One study of the legal
reasoning of ICSID tribunals found that “[i]t was quite common for tribu-
nals to use case law as a means to establish a presumption in favour of one
result, and thus for placing a burden of proof on one of the parties.”138
136. See Alschner, supra note 116, at 51. R
137. For example, in response to arbitral decisions that were perceived as constraining their regulatory
flexibility, states began including more expansive exception provisions. See Richard C. Chen, A Contrac-
tual Approach to Investor-State Regulatory Disputes, 40 Yale J. Int’l L. 295, 321–22 (2015).
138. Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals—An Empirical Analysis, 19 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 301, 336–37 (2008).
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The logic of the dialectic model proposed here would reject this first op-
tion. As noted earlier, in the absence of a formal doctrine of stare decisis, no
one tribunal can promote predictability by deferring to past decisions be-
cause there is no guarantee or legitimate expectation that future tribunals
will follow the same course. Nor can this problem be resolved by developing
a stronger norm of deference. If the expectation were that tribunals would
defer, even modestly, to the first solution that was adopted, the risk of en-
trenching error would become too great. And in contrast to a common law
system, there would be no high court with the authority to provide a course
correction if the initial approach proved to be flawed.
A second approach would reject deference of any sort, but would still
allow consideration of past decisions as persuasive authority. This is the
view, summarized earlier, taken by Irene Ten Cate.139 In short, Cate believes
the costs of consistency outweigh the benefits and thus contends that past
decisions should be consulted for their persuasive value alone. Some tribu-
nals have adopted this approach.140 The problem with this position is that it
gives too little weight to the value of predictability. At a certain point, once
a genuine consensus has formed, investors and states will begin to rely on
the prevailing view, and subsequent tribunals should take those expectations
into account before casting the consensus aside in pursuit of a better answer.
A third approach seeks a middle ground by affording deference only once
a particular rule or principle has been established in a consistent line of
cases. Andrea Bjorklund has suggested such an approach might be appropri-
ate by analogy to the French civil law model of jurisprudence constante. Under
this view, doctrine is developed “through the accretion of a consistent line
of cases, rather than the establishment of a rule by an individual case.”141
She argues that this approach strikes an appropriate balance by maximizing
the potential for past decisions to “creat[e] predictable and widely accepted
principles of investment law, while minimising any potential harm that
might ensue from such a system of de facto precedent.”142
The jurisprudence constante approach and the dialectic model proposed here
share the same basic philosophical orientation. Apart from agreeing on the
point that deference should not precede genuine consensus, advocates of the
jurisprudence constante approach also value the competition of ideas. As one
arbitrator has put it in supporting this view, “Arbitral jurisprudence can be
compared to a competitive market: various solutions to arising interpretative
139. See supra Section II.D.
140. See, e.g., AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, ¶ 30 (Apr. 26, 2005) (“Each tribunal remains sovereign and may retain . . . a different solution for
resolving the same problem; but decisions . . . dealing with the same or very similar issues may at least
indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest; this Tribunal may consider them in order to compare its
own position with those already adopted by its predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed
by one or more of these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution.”).
141. Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 273. R
142. Id. at 270.
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challenges compete for attention and acceptance; there is experimentation
going on. The most persuasive solutions will generate a momentum that
leads to ‘jurisprudence constante.’ ” 143
The remaining task is to translate this general conception into operational
guidance. The actual practices of civil law systems with respect to jurispru-
dence constante vary in their particulars,144 and those who have proposed its
incorporation into the ITA setting have not specified how it should work,
particularly with respect to how much flexibility remains to depart from an
established view.145 The framework I propose seeks to calibrate deference
based on a balancing of predictability, accuracy, and legitimacy concerns.
A good first step for tribunals is to take into account the stage of doctri-
nal development in the area they are addressing. When confronting rela-
tively novel questions, tribunals should be especially skeptical of past
decisions, to the point of proactively seeking out competing ideas. Even as
tribunals appear to be embracing the general idea of deferring only to con-
sistent lines of cases,146 there is a risk that they will be too quick to latch
onto an apparent consensus in practice.
Consider the following influential statement from a tribunal led by
Kauffman-Kohler:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions.
At the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consid-
eration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes
that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to
adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also
believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and the
circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contrib-
ute to the harmonious development of investment law and
thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of
States and investors toward certainty of the rule of law.147
The statement indicates that deference is warranted only when a solution has
been “established in a series of consistent cases.” But it also emphasizes a
broader duty to “contribute to the harmonious development of investment
143. Thomas W. Wa¨lde, The Present State of Research Carried out by the English Speaking Section of the
Centre for Studies and Research, in New Aspects of International Investment Law 63 (Philippe
Kahn & Thomas W. Wa¨lde eds., 2006).
144. See Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical
Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 La. L. Rev. 775, 787–92 (2005) (surveying
practices in France, Italy, and Spain).
145. Bjorklund, for example, defends the normative appeal of the jurisprudence constante model but does
not say what a tribunal should do with a consistent line of cases, beyond that they must be taken into
account. See Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 272–80. R
146. See Weeramantry, supra note 48, at 117 n.21 (collecting statements from tribunals suggesting R
deference to consistent lines of cases).
147. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007) (footnote omitted).
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law.” The risk is that embracing this broader responsibility will lead tribu-
nals to seek consistency and defer prematurely before a genuine consensus
exists.148 Both Bjorklund and Tai-Heng Cheng describe the informal pres-
sures that arbitrators face to discuss precedent, in particular because doing so
may enhance their reputation.149 A similar reputational concern suggests
that arbitrators may tend to conform rather than depart from past reasoning
when they feel they can plausibly do so, because they open themselves up for
more criticism by forging a new path on their own. Thus, during the early
phases of doctrinal development, my proposal would emphasize the impor-
tance of more active skepticism and robust debate as a safeguard against
premature deference.
Once the cases have converged on a common view in a particular area
following a robust debate, subsequent tribunals can fairly presume that the
consensus view is correct, and deference should be the norm. The question
then becomes whether and when a later tribunal’s accuracy concerns should
override the value of predictability. An initial point to reiterate here is that
there are two senses of accuracy, and the answer to the posed question de-
pends on which sense is at issue. When there is a strong case to be made that
past decisions have incorrectly interpreted the contracting states’ intent,
there is a more compelling argument that the tribunal should choose the
objectively right answer even at the cost of predictability. Even if one be-
lieves, as I have argued, that tribunals have additional obligations to the
broader system, their primary obligation is still to resolve disputes based on
faithful interpretations of the law. So when tools of interpretation reveal that
the contracting states’ intent is contrary to the consensus view, tribunals
should follow their primary obligation.150
Legitimacy concerns reinforce that conclusion. As noted earlier, tribunals
do not have explicit authority to develop the law of international invest-
ment.151 At most, they have some implied authority to do so based on the
states’ continued use of vague treaty language and continued willingness to
148. Sourgens cites two examples in which tribunals appeared to rely on one or two past decisions
“without considering whether [those decisions have been] broadly accepted.” Sourgens, supra note 129, R
at 241; see also id. at 241 n.384 (citing Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 123–28 (May 11, 2005); Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v.
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Provisional Measures, ¶ 50, 55 (May 8,
2009)). It is difficult to say with certainty whether those particular tribunals deferred to the cited deci-
sions or merely invoked them to confirm their own conclusions. But it seems fair to say as a general
matter that, unless a norm encouraging active skepticism develops, tribunals will sometimes defer be-
cause it is the easier path.
149. See Bjorklund, supra note 47, at 276–77; Cheng, supra note 13, at 1046. R
150. If the BIT at issue were entered into after the consensus view took hold, and the relevant lan-
guage remained unchanged, the tribunal could reasonably infer that the states intended to codify the
prevailing understanding. A more difficult question, which I bracket for present purposes, is whether
tribunals should take post-ratification conduct into account. For example, should a tribunal consider the
fact that a state has signed new BITs with the same operative language after a consensus view took hold
in interpreting an agreement by that same state entered into before the consensus was reached?
151. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. R
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have their disputes resolved in arbitration.152 But at the present moment,
the idea of deferring to the interpretations of past tribunals when the treaty
is best understood to mean something else may trigger the objection that
the tribunals are exceeding their proper role.
The calculation may change, however, when the tribunal’s concern is sim-
ply that prior cases have adopted a misguided solution. The first point to
remember is that one tribunal’s view may not in fact be clearly better than
the collective wisdom reflected in past decisions. And even if it is, predict-
ability concerns could trump. When there is no clear state intent, tribunals
need not be as concerned that by deferring to past decisions they are flouting
their primary obligation to apply the law correctly or otherwise harming
their own legitimacy. In that scenario, because there is no correct way to
fulfill their primary obligation, tribunals should feel freer to fulfill their
systemic obligations to further the coherent development of the law.
Tribunals facing this dilemma could draw on the considerations that
common law high courts use when deciding whether to depart from stare
decisis. Typically they look for some justification beyond that the earlier
case was wrongly decided.153 Relevant considerations include whether the
rule at issue is “unworkable,” whether the original decisions were “badly
reasoned,” the strength of the “reliance interests at stake,” and the lessons of
intervening experience.154 These factors, while highly discretionary in na-
ture, at least give tribunals a framework under which to analyze whether
departing from an unsound but established principle is warranted.
The primary focus of this Section has been on the question of deference to
past decisions, but the dialectic model has another, separate implication for
how tribunals should apply precedent. Return for a moment to the early
stage of doctrinal development, before any consensus has formed. Tribunals
do not face the binary choice of following or rejecting earlier decisions. The
third alternative, as is familiar to common law lawyers, is to distinguish the
precedent.155 Common law courts may be reluctant to overrule precedent
when there is a plausible way to distinguish it instead because the latter
path preserves a sense of stability.156 ITA tribunals often do the same,157
perhaps not with the explicit goal of preserving stability, but rather because
it is the easier path. If the present case has features that distinguish it from
152. See Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12 Ger-
man L.J. 1083, 1101–03 (2011).
153. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 42. R
154. Id. at 41–42.
155. Id. at 97 (“If the new case is dissimilar to the pending cases in ways that seem important, the
court will ‘distinguish’ it and reach a result different from what the precedent would otherwise suggest
or even dictate.”).
156. Id. at 99.
157. See Katharina Diel-Gligor, Towards Consistency in International Investment Ju-
risprudence: A Preliminary Ruling System for ICSID Arbitration 194–95 & n.823 (2017) (col-
lecting examples).
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the cited precedent, the tribunal need not grapple directly with the earlier
tribunal’s reasoning and can simply declare it to be inapposite.158
The dialectic model reveals costs to this practice that provide a reason for
caution. First, by distinguishing a prior decision rather than engaging di-
rectly with its reasoning, a tribunal misses the opportunity to more substan-
tially advance the dialogue. If the tribunal agrees with the past decision’s
reasoning, it should say so explicitly and explain why.159 And if there are
flaws in the earlier decision’s reasoning, it is better for the long-term clarity
and predictability of the law if those flaws are exposed so that the case can
be more swiftly discarded.160
Second, depending on precisely what language is used, distinguishing an
earlier decision may be seen as an implicit endorsement of its reasoning. If
tribunals work within the boundaries set by an earlier decision even as they
reach a different outcome, that decision’s reasoning may become entrenched
even though subsequent tribunals would not have endorsed it if they had
forced themselves to engage directly. Put another way, the act of distin-
guishing could be itself a form of deference.161 In a common law system, it
may be a benefit that “the discipline of distinguishing imposes some limits
on the second court’s creative capacity.”162 But in the ITA context, just as
deference to a single decision should be avoided because of the risks of error
it creates, so should tribunals avoid using the option of distinguishing as a
way to avoid rejecting reasoning with which they disagree.
2. Authoring Precedent
In contrast to the question of how much deference to afford past deci-
sions, there has been relatively little debate about how tribunals should ap-
proach the writing of decisions. The expressly stated views are relatively
uniform: most assume that cases should be analyzed, and decisions written,
158. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶
260 (Sept. 5, 2008) (deciding not to “enter[ ] into an evaluation of” cited precedents because “there are
significant factual and contextual differences with the present case”).
159. Some forms of distinguishing are actually intended to do just that. A court may distinguish a
precedent because it believes that a deeper understanding of the case’s true rationale requires a different
outcome in the present dispute. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 101 (drawing a distinction between R
distinguishing as a way of “limiting” unwise precedent and distinguishing as a way of “clarify[ing] the
intended scope” of a precedent). That is not problematic so long as any endorsement of the earlier
reasoning is intentional. The more problematic distinguishing I refer to above involves efforts to avoid
overruling or otherwise confronting the reasoning of a past decision.
160. To be clear, as suggested in the previous footnote, the act of distinguishing past cases could be
valuable in advancing the dialogue, insofar as it helps to clarify the boundaries of the rule at issue. The
point here is that tribunals should first engage the question of whether that rule is in fact the right one.
161. As noted above, I have been assuming for this part of the discussion that there is no consensus
view. Once a genuine consensus has formed, then a later tribunal’s decision to distinguish the earlier
cases is less problematic because it does not inhibit an ongoing dialogue or create the risk of entrenching
bad reasoning. The act of distinguishing can actually advance the dialogue in the sense described in the
preceding footnote.
162. Garner et al., supra note 37, at 98. R
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on narrow grounds. In practice, however, tribunals regularly offer reasoning
that is broader than what is needed to resolve the dispute at hand. As in the
prior Section, I provide a framework for approaching this issue rather than a
blanket answer. But it is worth emphasizing upfront that a distinguishing
feature of the proposed model is that it justifies the use of broader reasoning
under appropriate circumstances.
Some of those who take the conventional view that ITA disputes should
always be decided narrowly rely on an analogy to the common law. For
example, Joel Dahlquist draws on common law traditions in arguing that
tribunals should avoid dicta in their reasoning.163 In a common law system,
only the holding of a case formally binds future courts.164 Dahlquist ac-
knowledges that this distinction should be “theoretically irrelevant” in the
ITA context because there is no such thing as binding precedent.165 He
nonetheless concludes, drawing practical lessons from the common law expe-
rience, that later tribunals should distinguish between holding and dictum
in applying past decisions and that authoring tribunals should avoid engag-
ing in dicta to reduce the risk of confusion.166
Others make the same types of assumptions from a different starting
point—not the merits of common law reasoning, but rather their conception
of the arbitral role.167 For example, Karl-Heinz Bo¨ckstiegel, a leading arbi-
trator, describes his view of the role of tribunals as follows:
[W]e should be very much aware that arbitral tribunals receive
their authority and mandate from the parties and institutions
which appoint them for the case at hand. And that mandate is to
decide on the relief sought, and to consider all factual and legal
issues relevant for that decision, no less, but also no more.168
163. See Joel Dahlquist, Beside the Point—On Obiter Dicta in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 Arb.
Int’l 629, 630, 639 (2016).
164. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 44. R
165. Dahlquist, supra note 163, at 630. Zachary Douglas offers a helpful elaboration on this point: R
What is interesting is the growing tendency for arbitral tribunals to undertake a meticulous
examination of whether statements in prior awards are properly characterized as part of the
ratio decidendi or merely as obiter dictum. This is a little puzzling because it is a technique that
has developed in common law systems precisely to mitigate the effects of a strong doctrine of
precedent. It gives a judge room to maneuver in determining whether or not the past decision
is formally binding upon the judge. If the doctrine of precedent in investment treaty arbitra-
tion is much weaker, then what is the point of characterizing statements in prior awards as
part of the ratio or as mere obiter?
Douglas, supra note 34, at 107. R
166. Dahlquist, supra note 163, at 630, 639. R
167. Dahlquist himself makes both points. Apart from drawing on common law analogies, he also
writes, “When drafting an award, an arbitral tribunal is only obligated towards the parties who put it in
place.” Id. at 640.
168. Bo¨ckstiegel, supra note 15, at 588. Bo¨ckstiegel goes on to express a hope that his “awards are
persuasive enough to convince later tribunals to go on a similar path,” but any such effect should come
from necessary reasoning and not from dicta for which the tribunal “had no mandate.” Id.
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W. Michael Reisman, another well-known arbitrator, has similarly written
that ITA tribunals should view their mandate as “case-specific,” rather than
concerning themselves with “systemic implications.”169
The primary defense of the use of broader reasoning offered in this Section
is based on a functional argument for how best to balance predictability and
accuracy. But these formal concerns about arbitral authority warrant a more
direct response. In short, and as noted above in Section II.D, the judicial
model better reflects how ITA participants now understand the process than
does the contractual model. This does not mean that parties believe that
dispute resolution is secondary to law development, only that they reasonably
expect tribunals to be attentive to systemic concerns.170 Indeed, both states
and investors have said as much171 and actively encouraged tribunals to serve
a lawmaking function by extensively citing past arbitral decisions and treat-
ing them as having some normative force beyond their persuasive value.172
Thus, if the parties themselves want and expect tribunals to reason with
systemic implications in mind, then objections based on the arbitrators’ for-
mal mandate lose their force.
The weakening of those formal objections opens the door to rethinking
the practical effectiveness of incremental decision making. Notably, even
those commentators who have endorsed the broader understanding of the
arbitral role have not taken the further step I propose here of changing how
individual arbitrations should be approached. My proposal is that tribunals
begin with a very different mindset. If the ultimate goal of a dialectic pro-
cess is to produce guidance in the form of clear, generally applicable rules,
overly narrow reasoning is an obstacle to that process. Rather than approach-
ing their task solely as answering the isolated question posed by the two
disputing parties, tribunals should appreciate that their decision is contrib-
uting to a larger dialogue and tailor their reasoning to best advance that
discussion.
The dialectic model suggests, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that
it will sometimes be proper for tribunals to reason more broadly than is
strictly necessary to decide the case at hand. Consider, for example, a case in
169. W. Michael Reisman, “Case-Specific Mandates” Versus “Systemic Implications”: How Should Investment
Tribunals Decide?, 29 Arb. Int’l 131, 132 (2013). Reisman acknowledges limited exceptions to this
principle, allowing, for example, for the “thoughtful consideration of previous awards that are on-point.”
Id. Presumably this means allowing for past decisions to serve as persuasive authority but nothing more.
170. See King & Moloo, supra note 95, at 890. R
171. As noted earlier, a current Working Group of states discussing potential ITA reforms high-
lighted the states’ interest in systemic values like predictability, accuracy, and legitimacy. See U.N.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, supra note 17, at ¶ 28 (“[P]redictability and correctness were said to be R
values that support the rule of law, enhance confidence in the stability of the investment environment,
further bring legitimacy to the regime, and contribute to the development of investment law.”). Further,
state delegations that had consulted with their respective constituencies reported that “predictability was
important to investors as well, in that lack of predictability could constitute a risk factor for investors and
so inhibit investment.” Id.
172. Schill, supra note 152, at 1106–07. R
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which the complainant claims that the host state’s behavior violated provi-
sion X. It may be obvious to the tribunal that provision X has not been
violated. But at the same time, it would be useful to the participants in the
ITA community for a clearer understanding of provision X to develop. In
the right circumstances—if, at a minimum, the parties have argued the
matter and the tribunal has studied it and formed a view—the tribunal
should consider articulating that view for the benefit of later tribunals and
the broader international investment community.
A willingness to reason more broadly also has implications for the level of
generality at which the tribunal analyzes the facts. For example, assume that
there is a settled understanding of provision X, but that understanding is
pitched at an abstract level. In that instance, the tribunal may face a choice
between applying that general standard to a narrow version of the facts
before it and moving up a level of generality to place those facts into a
broader category. If the latter option is available, going that route helps
more to advance the dialogue about the concrete meaning of provision X.173
A further implication of the dialectic model is that tribunals should not
see the use of dicta as inherently problematic. As Zachary Douglas notes,
“Reasoning that might be characterized as obiter can be far more important
for the subsequent development of a coherent international law of invest-
ment than the reasoning deployed to justify the narrowly defined ratio of the
case.”174 This is not to suggest that tribunals should go off on wholly unre-
lated tangents or make uninformed assertions, but neither should they hold
back a useful explanation merely because it is not strictly necessary to the
outcome. For example, in concluding that the facts at hand do not constitute
a violation of provision X, a tribunal might explain how other facts would
have changed the result as a way to shed light on the provision’s meaning.175
The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that tribunals should
necessarily jump straight to the highest level of generality in every case. But
again, neither should they always confine themselves to the narrowest possi-
ble rationale. To promote predictability, individual tribunals must assume
the responsibility of articulating broader principles that would ordinarily
fall to courts of last resort in common law systems. They should not think
solely about the case at hand and wait passively for general guidance to
reveal itself. Rather, they should see each case as an opportunity to contrib-
ute toward developing that broader guidance, whether that means proposing
173. The scenario described in this paragraph is similar to what has occurred with the fair and equita-
ble treatment standard. As described in Section IV.B below, the standard has been defined at an abstract
level, but individual cases are resolved narrowly, and more categorical reasoning is needed to provide
broader guidance about the provision’s meaning.
174. Douglas, supra note 34, at 107. R
175. Common law courts sometimes draw a distinction between obiter dicta and judicial dicta. The
former consist of stray remarks, while the latter consist of technically superfluous but considered state-
ments. See Garner et al., supra note 37, at 62. There is never any justification for the former, but the R
latter may be appropriate in the right circumstances.
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a way to synthesize a group of decisions that came before or just offering up
a piece of a puzzle that a later tribunal will complete.
Calibrating the proper scope of reasoning for a given case depends not just
on predictability, but accuracy and legitimacy considerations as well. A few
words on what those two values mean in the present context are in order.
Accuracy at the authoring stage means not the correctness of the result in
the case at hand, but the soundness of the guidance provided to future tribu-
nals. An initial observation to make here is that the costs of error are dimin-
ished precisely because no reasoning will be binding on later tribunals. In
the absence of stare decisis, tribunals need not be concerned with the risk
that common law courts face of compelling future courts to reach bad results
or otherwise constraining their ability to adjust to unforeseen circumstances.
Thus, ITA tribunals should have more freedom to experiment with broader-
reaching ideas that may prove to be influential, but can be readily discarded
if further experience demonstrates that they are misguided.
Nonetheless, for a dialogue to be effective in facilitating consensus and
producing sound guidance, tribunals must offer informed and considered
ideas. Thus, accuracy concerns may in some circumstances require tribunals
to moderate the level of breadth at which they might otherwise have pitched
their decisions.
As for legitimacy, the main consideration tribunals must take into ac-
count is whether their broad reasoning will be perceived as going beyond
their proper role. The parties, which pay for the costs of arbitration proceed-
ings, may object to the use of their private dispute as a platform for the
development of law. The wider international investment community may
similarly frown upon any trend toward broader reasoning and eventually
push back by altering the dispute resolution terms of investment treaties or
opting out of the use of arbitration. On the other hand, as noted earlier,
views on legitimacy are not static and appear to be evolving toward accept-
ance of ITA tribunals playing a lawmaking role and functioning as a broader
system. In any event, tribunals should take into account both the circum-
stances of a particular case and the then-prevailing perceptions of ITA tribu-
nals when deciding how legitimacy concerns should affect their approach.176
176. It could be argued that tribunals should consider legitimacy in determining not only the scope
of their reasoning but also the content of their decisions. In particular, since ITA’s survival as a regime
ultimately depends on state consent, tribunals may feel some pressure to decide cases in a manner that
states would approve of. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The
Dual Role of States, 104 Am. J. Int’l L. 179, 198 (2010). Such concerns may indeed be responsible for a
perceived shift in the orientation of arbitrators since earlier ITA decisions faced a backlash for being too
generous to investors. See Fre´de´ric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following the Denuncia-
tion of International Investment Agreements, 11 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 335, 358–59 (2013). I bracket the
question of whether such a shift was appropriate, except to note that it is difficult to separate legitimacy
and accuracy in this context. Because states are drafting the treaties at issue, tribunals may believe states’
views are entitled to some weight in the interpretation process and may not merely be acting to avoid
backlash.
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How then should tribunals balance predictability, accuracy, and legiti-
macy concerns in the context of a particular case? As in the preceding Sec-
tion, focusing on the stage of doctrinal development is a helpful place to
start. When there are few other cases addressing a particular issue, tribunals
may need to proceed modestly, not because they would be expected to defer
to earlier decisions, but because there would be limited information about
the different factual contexts in which the issue at hand may arise. As addi-
tional cases accumulate, later tribunals can attempt to fashion a general rule
that properly takes into account the range of circumstances that can be ex-
pected to arise.177
In developing the meaning of a provision, tribunals may also find it pru-
dent to build upward in stages rather than leaping to the highest level of
generality and then filling in the details below. As I show in Section IV.B
below, tribunals faced with as yet undefined treaty terms have sometimes
attempted to start off by articulating a comprehensive understanding of
their meaning. This is, of course, the exact opposite of what convention
demands, but the temptation to do so is understandable given that they are
writing on blank slates, and the international investment community may
have expressed a desire for general guidance. The danger, even assuming
that later tribunals refrain from deferring prematurely to the proposed view,
is that the debate gets off and running on misguided premises. Tribunals
may want instead to move upward in generality more gradually. They can
build consensus around categories of cases before moving toward a more
comprehensive definition. Such an approach reduces concerns about accuracy
and legitimacy because it bases general guidance on accumulated wisdom
rather than a single tribunal’s perspective.
In assessing whether the stage of doctrinal development counsels mod-
esty, tribunals should also consider whether the issue is one on which further
information is needed. For example, tribunals may feel comfortable issuing
broad guidance on pure questions of law because further information from
future cases will not influence their view.178 By contrast, when interpreting
provisions that are intended to function as fact-intensive standards, it may
be necessary to proceed more gradually. Relatedly, tribunals should take
into account the quality and thoroughness of the briefing they have received.
It would not typically make sense to attempt to fashion a general rule when
the parties have not adequately addressed the issue from that perspective.
Apart from their own comfort level in reasoning broadly, tribunals should
also consider whether the issue at hand is one on which states and investors
are in particular need of guidance. Not every question has an equal effect on
the ability of investors to plan their business affairs and of states to set their
177. Sourgens makes a similar point about the primary value of past decisions. They are useful be-
cause they “set the scope of legally relevant facts that must be taken into account in interpreting an
[international investment agreement].” Sourgens, supra note 129, at 236. R
178. For an example, see infra Section IV.A.
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regulatory agenda. Matters of substance are generally where predictability is
most needed, because investors and states may make different decisions de-
pending on how the scope of their protections and liabilities, respectively,
are defined. Conversely, clarity surrounding matters of procedure or remedy
might be less urgent because they influence planning less directly.
Finally, as noted already, tribunals can factor in the amount of legitimacy
capital that the ITA system in general holds, apart from the circumstances
of any given case. To the extent that states, investors, and the broader com-
munity grow more comfortable with tribunals playing a lawmaking role,
they can be increasingly willing to write decisions that do just that.
IV. Illustrating the Dialectic Model
In developing the framework proposed in Part III, I have necessarily re-
lied on abstractions and stylized examples. To provide a more concrete un-
derstanding of how the framework would work in practice, this final Part
walks through three extended, real-world examples and explains where the
dialectic model would have counseled a different approach. The first Section
addresses the interpretation of most-favored-nation (“MFN”) clauses and
shows how tribunals converged prematurely around a conventional wisdom
that is now being belatedly questioned. The second Section addresses the
interpretation of fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) provisions and shows
how tribunals again converged prematurely, this time helped along by un-
duly broad statements of principle by tribunals that would have benefited
from more factual information. The third Section addresses the question of
whether human rights have any bearing on investment treaty obligations
and shows how tribunals have largely avoided the issue, thereby preventing
a dialogue that is needed to clarify how these two areas interact.
A. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
The general idea of an MFN clause is that two countries agree that “each
will treat the other as well as it treats any other country that is given prefer-
ential treatment.”179 In the context of investment treaties, the conventional
wisdom has been that MFN clauses permit the importation of substantive
rights. In other words, foreign investors may use an MFN clause between
their home state and the host state to import a more favorable provision
from a different investment treaty.180 The alternative view, recently adopted
by the tribunal in I˙c¸kale v. Turkmenistan181 and elaborated on by Simon Ba-
tifort and J. Benton Heath, is that MFN clauses should be limited to reme-
179. Most-Favored-Nation Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
180. See Simon Batifort & J. Benton Heath, The New Debate on the Interpretation of MFN Clauses in
Investment Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateralization, 111 Am. J. Int’l L. 873, 881 (2018).
181. I˙c¸kale I˙ns¸aat Ltd. S¸irketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award, ¶ 328 (Mar. 8,
2016).
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dying discrimination that favors investors from one foreign country over
investors from another foreign country.182 My aim is not to decide whether
the importation view or the discrimination view is correct, but rather to
explore how the precedential dialogue could have been conducted more ef-
fectively by the tribunals involved and to suggest where tribunals should go
from here.
Batifort and Heath helpfully document the chronology of how tribunals
converged upon the importation view. The process began in 2000, when the
tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain established a dichotomy between procedural
and substantive provisions.183 Over the next few years, tribunals took com-
peting views on whether an MFN clause permits the importation of more
favorable dispute resolution provisions, but tribunals on both sides simply
assumed as their starting point that the importation of substantive standards
would be uncontroversial.184 This presumption, asserted repeatedly in dicta,
played a role in cementing the conventional wisdom as tribunals actually
confronting the issue reached the same conclusion.
The first published ITA decision permitting the importation of substan-
tive provisions came in MTD v. Chile,185 and between 2004 and 2009 several
other tribunals reached the same conclusion.186 They generally came to the
same answer independently, but they used a fairly perfunctory analysis to do
so.187 As of 2009, the earlier decisions were considered to reflect conven-
tional wisdom, and later tribunals cited them accordingly.188 Others relied
on the entrenched Maffezini procedure/substance distinction to simply de-
clare that MFN clauses clearly permitted the adoption of the latter.189
The I˙c¸kale tribunal was the first to provide an alternative view, and only
after the conventional wisdom had coalesced. In adopting the discrimination
view for the MFN clause at issue, the tribunal focused on the treaty lan-
guage, which stated: “Each Party shall accord to these investments, once
established, treatment no less favourable than that accorded in similar situa-
182. Batifort & Heath, supra note 180, at 880–81. R
183. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 41 (Jan. 25, 2000).
184. Batifort & Heath, supra note 180, at 887–89. R
185. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 113 (May
25, 2004).
186. Batifort & Heath, supra note 180, at 890–97. R
187. See, e.g., MTD, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, at ¶ 104 (addressing the issue in a single
paragraph that appeared to confuse MFN and fair and equitable treatment); ATA Constr., Indus. and
Trading Co. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award, ¶ 125 n.16 (May 18,
2010) (resolving the issue in a single-sentence footnote).
188. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S¸. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 158 (Aug. 27, 2009) (citing the MTD decision in support of its conclu-
sion); Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 541 (Dec.
15, 2014) (noting that “a number of contemporary arbitral decisions” had also allowed the use of MFN
clauses “to import fair and equitable treatment”).
189. See, e.g., White Indus. Aust. Ltd. v. Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 11.2.3–.4
(Nov. 30, 2011); EDF Int’l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, ¶¶
935–36 (June 11, 2012).
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tions to investments of its investors or to investors of any third country,
whichever is the most favourable.”190 The tribunal explained that the phrase
“similar situations” meant that claimants had to show that another investor
from a different country was treated more favorably, not merely that some
other treaty provided for a more favorable legal right.191 Batifort and Heath
endorse the reasoning as an example of effective “bottom-up” interpretation
that is appropriately sensitive to specific treaty language.192
Without having to take a position on the merits of the debate,193 it seems
fair to assert that the arguments now being raised against the conventional
wisdom would ideally have been identified earlier in the process. It is diffi-
cult to say how much work in these later decisions was being done by prece-
dent as opposed to the tribunals’ independent reasoning. But it is at least
telling that the independent analysis was generally quite abbreviated, lack-
ing a serious consideration of counterarguments.194 Notably, the language
carefully scrutinized by the tribunal in I˙c¸kale was not unique; tribunals
adopting the importation view had previously considered MFN provisions
including the “similar situations” language.195
For Batifort and Heath, the broader theoretical concern that their account
reveals is that tribunals have taken a top-down approach to treaty interpreta-
tion.196 In other words, tribunals relied on “presumptions as to the nature or
essence of MFN clauses in general” rather than conducting a “careful analy-
sis of the text of specific clauses” in each individual treaty.197 For purposes of
this Article, the fact that tribunals used a top-down approach underscores a
different point: that differences in treaty language are easily overlooked in
the pursuit of consensus. Of course, particularly since several tribunals
reached the same conclusion independently, it may be that tribunals con-
190. I˙c¸kale I˙ns¸aat Ltd. S¸irketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award, ¶ 326 (Mar. 8,
2016) (citing Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-
Turkm., art. II, ¶ 2, May 2, 1992).
191. Id. ¶ 329.
192. Batifort & Heath, supra note 180, at 899. R
193. For a critique of the I˙c¸kale tribunal’s reasoning, see Stephan W. Schill, MFN Clauses as Bilateral
Commitments to Multilateralism: A Reply to Simon Batifort and J. Benton Heath, 111 Am. J. Int’l L. 914,
929–33 (2018). In addition to commissioning the Schill response, the American Journal of International
Law hosted a symposium on the Batifort and Heath article in its online forum. See Donald McRae,
Introduction to the Symposium on Simon Batifort & J. Benton Heath, “The New Debate on the Interpretation of
MFN Clauses in Investment Treaties: Putting the Brakes on Multilateralization,” 112 AJIL Unbound 38
(2018) (summarizing the debate and the views of four symposium contributors).
194. Of course, the length of the written decision does not necessarily reflect the extent of the analysis
actually conducted. Some courts are known for writing short opinions that do not explain their reason-
ing. See Andre´ Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 Tul. L. Rev. 459, 467 (1976) (describing
the example of the French Court of Cassation). But the norm in ITA is for tribunals to provide a more
robust explanation of their reasoning, so it stands out when some aspect of a decision seems truncated. See
Fauchald, supra note 138, at 308. And under the dialectic model, such an abbreviated analysis is prob- R
lematic because effective dialogue depends on tribunals offering thorough reasoning.
195. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S¸. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 386 (Aug. 27, 2009).
196. See Batifort & Heath, supra note 180, at 874. R
197. Id.
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verged quickly not only because they were deferring to precedent, but also
because the past cases confirmed their own intuitions. After all, as Batifort
and Heath acknowledge, the fact that MFN clauses had been used for im-
portation in other contexts explains why tribunals may have had precon-
ceived notions of what such clauses should mean in investment treaties.198
Even so, the dialectic model proposed here emphasizes the importance of
active skepticism precisely to ferret out misconceptions before they congeal.
And although it is impossible to say whether closer examination would have
led the tribunals to a different conclusion, the troubling point is precisely
that no such in-depth analysis took place.
In addition to questioning whether the later tribunals deferred too readily
to precedent, it is also fair to ask whether the earlier tribunals bear responsi-
bility for making pronouncements that stunted the debate.199 An initial ob-
servation on this point is that the meaning of an MFN provision is a pure
legal question. Thus, it is one that tribunals should feel comfortable answer-
ing based on treaty text and structure, without having to wait for future
cases to clarify the range of possible factual circumstances. However, at least
those tribunals that pronounced on the question of importing substantive
provisions in cases involving the importation of procedural rights can fairly
be criticized for overstepping. The dialectic model accepts the value of in-
formed judicial dicta for the sake of providing guidance,200 but the tribunals
in this circumstance appeared to be making stray assertions without analy-
sis, which had the effect of helping to cement a conventional wisdom before
certainty was warranted.
Given the existence of an apparent consensus, the remaining question is
whether tribunals should feel free, as the I˙c¸kale tribunal did, to reverse
course if they are persuaded by the argument. This is where the nature of the
purported inaccuracy becomes important. Although the choice between the
two views comes with serious policy consequences,201 the reasoning in I˙c¸kale,
bolstered by Batifort and Heath, is based on interpretation. They present at
the very least a plausible case that MFN provisions using the “similar situa-
tions” language are best understood as protecting against discrimination
198. See id. at 886; see also Schill, supra note 193, at 922 (arguing for the importation view based on R
“general international law rules on the interpretation of MFN clauses”).
199. One might say that so long as tribunals do not improperly defer at the application stage, it does
not matter what authoring tribunals do. While that is true to a point, the dialogue as a whole will be
better if authoring tribunals refrain from making broad pronouncements that are not fully informed.
200. On the difference between judicial dicta and obiter dicta, see supra note 175. R
201. On the one hand, the importation view promotes the multilateralization of international invest-
ment law, which may be desirable from the standpoint of uniformity and economic interdependence. See
Schill, supra note 193, at 934. On the other hand, the “ ‘combinations and permutations’ of investment R
protections resulting from MFN importation” may make it harder for states “to predict their scope of
potential liability.” Batifort & Heath, supra note 180, at 875. Further, “expansive applications of MFN R
could undermine efforts . . . to ‘rebalance’ investment agreements” because any changes made to new
treaties will be rendered moot by the ability to import the provisions of older ones. Id.
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only. The weakness of the reasoning in the decisions that helped establish
the conventional wisdom is also a justification for reopening the debate.202
Under the dialectic model, when a tribunal’s disagreement is based on
interpretation rather than policy, concerns about predictability are given less
weight. Legitimacy concerns also weigh in favor of respecting the best un-
derstanding of the states’ intent over deferring to arbitral precedent. Thus, if
future tribunals are persuaded that I˙c¸kale’s interpretation is objectively more
accurate, they would be free under the dialectic model to disregard the ex-
isting consensus and adopt the discrimination view.
B. Fair and Equitable Treatment
The FET provision is the most important investment treaty standard. It is
the most commonly invoked standard and the one most likely to form the
basis of a finding of liability.203 There is general consensus that the provision
was intended to be a catch-all, offering flexibility for claimants to challenge
host state conduct that might not fit neatly into another more specific provi-
sion.204 FET has been invoked to address a variety of concerns, such as denial
of due process, coercion, harassment, and lack of transparency.205 This Sec-
tion explores the evolution of the FET standard, showing how in this area,
tribunals did not shy away from offering broad guidance. But consensus
around the broad concepts may have formed prematurely, and given the
fact-intensive nature of the issue, a more gradual approach may have been
warranted.
The origins of the FET standard date back to the treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation entered into during the 1950s.206 In the decades
that followed, the provision was widely adopted in bilateral investment trea-
ties as well as in multilateral economic treaties that covered investment is-
sues.207 We pick up the story in the 1990s, when FET emerged as a key
focal point in investment disputes.
Debates over the meaning of fair and equitable treatment were robust in
one sense. Parties and commentators vigorously disputed, and tribunals
carefully examined, the question of whether FET should be treated as an
autonomous treaty standard or as a mere codification of the international
202. In his response to the Batifort and Heath article, Stephan Schill, while disagreeing that the
larger group of MFN clauses needs to be reevaluated, does agree that some of the relevant decisions were
poorly reasoned. See Schill, supra note 193, at 916 (“[T]he reasoning of many arbitral tribunals, in partic- R
ular in earlier cases, is weak and unsatisfying, and therefore constitutes a brittle basis for constructing a
jurisprudence constante on the issue in question.”).
203. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, U.N. Doc. A/UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, at 1 (2012).
204. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 132. R
205. See id. at 145.
206. See id. at 130–31.
207. See Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. World Inv. &
Trade 357, 358–59 (2005).
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minimum standard in customary international law.208 Most tribunals now
take the former view.209
While the debate just described has been ongoing, tribunals that took the
view that the standard was autonomous also endeavored to work out the
scope of protection it offered. In 2003, the tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico set
forth what would become the leading statement of the meaning of FET:
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent
manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its rela-
tions with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand
any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments,
as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and com-
ply with such regulations.210
The actual dispute in Tecmed concerned the host state’s refusal to renew an
operating permit, which purportedly frustrated the claimant’s “justified ex-
pectation of the continuity and duration of the investment made.”211 The
tribunal concluded that Mexico had violated its FET guarantee by acting in
“contradictory and ambiguous” ways, thereby leaving the claimant unable
to plan its business activities.212
The best interpretation of the tribunal’s holding is that it concerned a
failure of transparency, making other aspects of its definition dicta.213 But
based on that more comprehensive definition of FET, the case came to stand
for the further proposition that host states are required to provide stability
and protect investors’ legitimate expectations, and that a failure to do so
may result in liability even in the absence of bad faith.214 Later tribunals, in
CMS v. Argentina and Occidental v. Ecuador, for example, relied on Tecmed for
this proposition and solidified this conception of FET by finding that it was
208. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 134–39. R
209. See id. at 137. Another possibility still being actively debated is whether the meaning of custom-
ary international law has evolved to track the interpretation of the treaty standard. See id. at 138–39; see
also Marcela Klein Bronfman, Fair and Equitable Treatment: An Evolving Standard, 10 Max Planck Y.B.
U.N. L. 609, 670–72 (2006).
210. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003).
211. Id. at ¶ 41.
212. Id. at ¶ 172.
213. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 151 (describing the Tecmed holding in a section on R
transparency); Josef Ostrˇansky´, An Exercise in Equivocation: A Critique of Legitimate Expectations as a General
Principle of Law Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in General Principles of Law and
International Investment Arbitration 344, 371 (Andrea Gattini et al. eds., 2018) (noting that
the legitimate expectations principle announced in Tecmed was not actually applied to the facts of the
case).
214. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 145–49 (summarizing this aspect of FET and draw- R
ing on Tecmed, among other decisions). This conception of FET predated Tecmed, see id. at 145–46, but
Tecmed appears to have been the most influential statement of that viewpoint, perhaps because it con-
sciously “assumed the broader task” of setting forth “the full reach of the FET standard,” see Rudolf
Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 7, 14 (2013).
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violated based on inconsistency alone.215 A consensus appears to have been
formed around this view.216
Yet commentators have shown flaws in Tecmed’s thin reasoning as well as
serious policy concerns that follow from its interpretation. Both of those
issues create doubts about the accuracy of Tecmed’s definition and, in turn,
the quality of the dialogue that followed.
First as to Tecmed’s reasoning, the tribunal purported to ground its defini-
tion in the “good faith principle established by international law.”217 But it
is not clear why a requirement that host states act in good faith should
subject them to potential liability even for regulatory changes undertaken
without bad faith.218 Later tribunals pointed to the purpose of investment
treaties, sometimes noting preambular language about stability, to support
their interpretation.219 But even that does not make clear that host states
should be liable for inconsistency in the absence of bad faith. At a mini-
mum, it seems difficult to deny that the legitimate expectations principle is
an “arbitral innovation” rather than something that obviously follows from
the FET concept.220
From a policy standpoint, the willingness of tribunals to find liability
even in the absence of bad faith has led to backlash among states and harsh
criticism by commentators. When concerns about the excesses of the inter-
national investment law regime are described, the focus is typically on cases
involving good-faith regulatory changes.221 Few would disagree that pro-
tecting investors from abusive or exploitative host state conduct is a lauda-
ble goal. The claims challenging efforts to regulate in the public interest,
which Tecmed opened the door to, are the ones creating concerns about regu-
latory chill and infringements on host state sovereignty.222 These concerns
215. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 146–47 (summarizing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. R
Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005), and Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (July 1, 2004)).
216. See Dolzer, supra note 214, at 18–19 (describing the “consolidat[ion]” of this position beginning R
with Tecmed in 2003 and finishing in 2011 with El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 27, 2011)).
217. Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, at ¶ 154.
218. Michele Potesta`, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the
Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID Rev. 88, 92 (2013).
219. CMS, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, at ¶ 274.
220. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 203, at R
9; see also Potesta`, supra note 218, at 90–91 (describing how the principle was established in a series of R
cases featuring minimal analysis).
221. See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 775, 782 (2008) (“Public
interest regulations are promulgated by elected officials to protect the welfare of the state’s citizens and
nationals. Thus, interference with these regulations by unelected and unappointed arbitrators is not
consistent with basic principles of democracy.” (citation omitted)).
222. See Jason Haynes, The Evolving Nature of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) Standard: Challeng-
ing Its Increasing Pervasiveness in Light of Developing Countries’ Concerns–The Case for Regulatory Rebalancing,
14 J. World Inv. & Trade 114, 133–34 (2013).
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are evidence that the principles set forth in Tecmed are not just suspect as a
matter of legal reasoning but unsound as a matter of policy.
Of course, the relevant question for present purposes is not whether
Tecmed’s interpretation of FET is correct. Rather, it is whether the tribunals
settled too quickly on that understanding. As in the preceding Section, it is
impossible to know just how much the tribunals relied on Tecmed as author-
ity, as opposed to citing it merely to bolster conclusions they would have
reached independently. But it is again telling that their analyses were rela-
tively brief apart from their citation to precedent.
In MTD v. Chile, for example, the tribunal’s independent analysis con-
sisted of a single paragraph. Examining the plain meaning of the words
“fair” and “equitable” and the object and purpose of the treaty did not yield
much insight, only the unremarkable conclusion that “fair and equitable
treatment should be understood to be treatment in an even-handed and just
manner, conducive to fostering the promotion of foreign investment.”223
The court then quoted the comprehensive definition set forth in Tecmed
before concluding, without further explanation, “this is the standard that
the Tribunal will apply to the facts of this case.”224
Thin reasoning of that sort suggests that Tecmed became the “most often
cited [award] in arbitral jurisprudence”225 not because it was especially per-
suasive, but because it was the most comprehensive statement to date and
bore the hallmarks of an authoritative interpretation. Given that the doc-
trine was still in the early stage of development, the dialectic model would
have counseled not only against such premature deference, but in favor of
more active skepticism. Instead of a robust dialogue, the legitimate expecta-
tions principle came about as the result of apparent inertia. As one commen-
tator summarized it: the early tribunals identified the legitimate
expectations principle without any concrete authority, “[l]ater cases picked
up on their pronouncements[,] and suddenly we are faced with ‘established
jurisprudence on [legitimate expectations].’ ” 226
Moreover, to the extent tribunals did question the reasoning of Tecmed and
its progeny, it was only to note that the stability requirement should not be
interpreted to literally freeze the host state’s regulatory framework at the
time of investment.227 The investor’s legitimate expectations would need to
be assessed “in light of the objective circumstances prevailing in the host
state.”228 Later tribunals were able to distinguish their facts from CMS and
223. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 113 (May
25, 2004).
224. Id. at ¶¶ 114–15; see also Bronfman, supra note 209, at 640 (describing the reference to the R
Tecmed definition as “decisive” in the MTD tribunal’s analysis).
225. Dolzer, supra note 214, at 14. R
226. Ostrˇansky´, supra note 213, at 349. R
227. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 23, at 148–49. R
228. Joshua Paine, On Investment Law and Questions of Change, 19 J. World Inv. & Trade 173, 189
(2018).
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Occidental on these and other grounds, but in doing so helped to reinforce the
basic principle that instability in the absence of bad faith is at least poten-
tially sufficient to trigger liability.229
It is also worth asking, from the standpoints of both accuracy and legiti-
macy, whether Tecmed acted prematurely in purporting to set forth a compre-
hensive definition.230 Given the vague meaning of FET, it is understandable
that tribunals would want to provide clarity and guidance to the investment
community, and indeed one of my main suggestions above is that tribunals
should consider this to be part of their role. But FET is, as tribunals have
recognized, a fact-intensive standard.231 As such, there would have been
good reason to proceed more gradually in developing a comprehensive defi-
nition. Tecmed could have provided a building block by just recognizing
transparency as a component of FET, while leaving it to later tribunals to
move up a further level of generality. Later tribunals could then have made
the assessment of whether inconsistency in the absence of bad faith should
suffice to trigger liability with the benefit of information drawn from subse-
quent disputes. Whatever answer they settled on not only would have been
better informed, but also would have raised fewer legitimacy objections fol-
lowing the use of a collective decision making process.232
Despite a less-than-ideal process and continued criticism by commenta-
tors and states, the debate on this aspect of FET appears to be settled among
tribunals. The question, then, is whether any tribunals taking a different
view should be willing to depart from the principle established in a consis-
tent line of cases. In this regard, it is significant that any disagreement
would likely be based on policy concerns rather than evidence of the correct
interpretation of the treaty language.233 While the original reasoning adopt-
ing the stability principle may have been weak in itself, the open-ended
nature of the FET provision makes it difficult to refute that interpretation
decisively. Thus, to the extent their disagreement is on policy grounds,
tribunals should avoid departing from precedent because doing so likely cre-
ates more harm from the standpoint of predictability than benefit in greater
accuracy. In particular, the importance of FET as a source of investor protec-
229. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award,
¶¶ 257–60 & n.389 (Sept. 5, 2008) (distinguishing CMS because the investor in this case had not
received “specific guarantees” of stability, but still acknowledging stability as a relevant consideration).
230. The same caveat I made in the preceding Section applies here. One might say that the applying
tribunals bear more responsibility for over-relying on Tecmed’s reasoning, but it nonetheless seems fair to
ask authoring tribunals to self-regulate for the sake of improving the process overall.
231. See, e.g., Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 118 (Oct.
11, 2002) (noting that “[a] judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the abstract; it
must depend on the facts of the particular case”).
232. See Ostrˇansky´, supra note 213, at 373 (citing Tecmed as an example of “how easily controversial R
and unprincipled legal solutions can come to hold sway in the area of investment arbitration”).
233. This point does not necessarily apply to new treaties in which states may have attempted to scale
back the scope of FET protections. See Paine, supra note 228, at 190–91. In those instances, tribunals R
could of course read the FET provision more narrowly, based on the specific language in the treaty.
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tion—both in terms of its prominence and substantive breadth—means that
reliance concerns have particular force.
Recent trends suggest that tribunals have been trying to find a middle
ground. They respect the established line of cases by recognizing that stabil-
ity and the protection of legitimate expectations are part of the FET guaran-
tee. But they mitigate the effects of that interpretation by ensuring a degree
of latitude for states to make regulatory changes, either by interpreting le-
gitimate expectations more narrowly or by relying on other doctrines like
proportionality and margin of appreciation.234 These solutions may raise
problems of their own,235 but from the standpoint of the practice of prece-
dent, they represent an arguably fair balance of the relevant considerations.
A degree of predictability is preserved by not disrupting an established line
of cases, while the concerns of accuracy are addressed by adapting the rule at
issue to mitigate its problematic effects.
A final concern remains regarding how the law of fair and equitable treat-
ment is to be developed from this point on. Despite some consensus around
the broad meaning of fair and equitable treatment and the components that
go into it, it remains as difficult as ever to know what conduct will actually
trigger liability.236 The broad principles standing alone are indeterminate
and need to be given meaning through their application to concrete facts.
But the actual approach often taken by tribunals (which may not conceive of
themselves as precedent setters) fails at this task. Benedict Kingsbury and
Stephan Schill, writing about deficiencies in arbitral decisions more gener-
ally, describe the problem as “ ‘I-know-it-when-I-see-it’-type of reasoning,”
in which the tribunals offer “an extensive summary of the facts of the case at
hand . . . followed by [an] abrupt determination with little intelligible legal
reasoning.”237
In other words, despite including some broad statements of principles,
tribunals are producing the sorts of narrow, fact-bound decisions that pre-
vent effective dialogue and make predictability unattainable. Later tribunals
cannot draw any precedential guidance from such decisions because they do
not know exactly which facts mattered and why.238 A minimal first step for
tribunals to take in order to facilitate more effective analogical reasoning is
to emphasize which facts are determinative and explain their legal signifi-
cance. But to achieve predictability in the long run, tribunals must also
reason more categorically. That means moving up a level of generality, plac-
ing the very specific facts at issue into categories of conduct so that, over
234. See id. at 191–95; see also Chen, supra note 137, at 308–13. This is not unlike how common law R
courts try to adapt rather than overturn the principles established in past cases. The key difference is that,
under the dialectic model, ITA tribunals should not prioritize stability until a consensus has formed.
235. See Chen, supra note 137, at 308–13. R
236. See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 222, at 119–21. R
237. See Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 89, at 51. This problem is not unique to arbitral tribunals. See R
Watford et al., supra note 14, at 573 (describing the same concern for U.S. courts). R
238. See Watford et al., supra note 14, at 570–71. R
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time, the investment community can develop a “working sense” of how
various common fact scenarios are likely to be resolved.239
C. The Intersection of Human Rights and Investment Treaty Obligations
Human rights and investment treaty obligations intersect in two main
ways. One is when investors draw on human rights principles and analogies
in support of their claims.240 Another is when host states use human rights
obligations as a defense against an investment treaty claim.241 This Section
focuses on the latter intersection and argues that tribunals have been too
hesitant to articulate any general framework for addressing this problem,
which is likely to arise with increasing frequency.
The issue has arisen most prominently in cases involving the right to
water. In the typical case, a foreign investor that privately owns the water
supply brings investment treaty claims after the host state terminates con-
cessions or freezes tariffs “in order to secure adequate access to water at
affordable prices.”242 The host state in turn argues that this action was nec-
essary to comply with its obligation to promote the right to water, as codi-
fied in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
among other conventions.243 The question facing tribunals, therefore, is
whether and to what extent human rights obligations can serve as a defense
to investment treaty liability.
At least a couple of tribunals have supplied an answer and thereby con-
tributed one viewpoint to the dialogue. Their answer is simply to say that
human rights obligations are no defense to investment treaty liability, be-
cause the host state faces no conflict: if a certain action is necessary to fulfill
human rights, the host state may do it and pay the investor appropriate
compensation.244 Again, the merits of that position are not our immediate
concern. More relevant for present purposes is how several other tribunals
have ducked the issue. Some have done so by simply never addressing the
arguments despite including them in their summary of the host state’s posi-
tion.245 Others have gone so far as to acknowledge that human rights obliga-
239. Garner et al., supra note 37, at 81. R
240. See Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights Law in International Investment Arbi-
tration, 11 Asian J. WTO & Int’l Health L. & Pol’y. 65, 72 (2016).
241. See id.
242. Id. at 81.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶ 262 (July 30, 2010) (“Argentina is subject to both interna-
tional obligations, i.e. human rights and treaty obligation, and must respect both of them equally. Under
the circumstances of the case, Argentina’s human rights obligations and its investment treaty obligations
are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, Argentina could have
respected both types of obligations.”).
245. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/
05/22, Award, ¶ 434 (July 24, 2008) (“Water and sanitation services are vitally important, and the
Republic has more than a right to protect such services in case of a crisis: it has a moral and perhaps even
a legal obligation to do so.”); see also id. at ¶ 387 (summarizing the human rights arguments made in
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tions could be relevant, but decided that the issue was unnecessary to resolve
in the particular circumstances of the case.246
The recent decision in Urbaser SA v. Argentine Republic247 may mark a
turning point. There the tribunal acknowledged the host state’s defense that
it was obligated “to guarantee the continuation of the basic water supply to
millions of Argentines.”248 It explained that “[t]he protection of this uni-
versal basic human right constitutes the framework within which Claimants
should frame their expectations.”249 Although the tribunal found the host
state liable for lack of transparency,250 its decision to consider human rights
arguments that it could have avoided, and to suggest where they fit into the
larger analysis, served as a valuable contribution to the dialogue.
Without implying that any particular tribunal prior to Urbaser erred by
avoiding the issue, I do suggest that this is an area in which a broader
dialogue would be fruitful. First, the need for predictability on this issue is
compelling. The intersection between human rights and investment treaty
obligations is likely to arise with increasing frequency. As foreign investor
claims increasingly involve challenges to good-faith regulatory changes, host
states are likely to justify them as necessary to fulfill human rights obliga-
tions. Commentators have pointed out that recently challenged tobacco reg-
ulations, for example, could have been defended as necessary to promote
public health.251 If not raised by the host states, human rights concerns are
likely to come in via amicus curiae submissions, which tribunals are increas-
ingly willing to consider.252 States, investors, and the broader public alike
would benefit from more guidance on whether this defense is viable and
what its requirements are.253
amicus curiae submissions). After acknowledging the argument, the tribunal did not address it in its
analysis. See id. at ¶¶ 451–521.
246. The best example of this comes from outside the right-to-water context. In Glamis Gold, Ltd. v.
United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb., Award (June 8, 2009), certain mining regulations were justi-
fied in part based on the need to protect the human rights of indigenous populations. See Susan L.
Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 423,
428–29 (2013). The tribunal acknowledged the arguments, but decided they were unnecessary to address
because it was ruling in favor of the state on other grounds. Glamis Gold, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb.,
Award, at ¶ 8. The tribunal went on to criticize the tendency of tribunals to “ma[k]e statements not
required by the case before” them. Id.
247. Urbaser SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016).
248. Id. at ¶ 624.
249. Id.
250. Id. at ¶ 845. The Urbaser case is also significant for being the first to accept jurisdiction over a
human rights counterclaim. For an analysis of this aspect of the case, see Edward Guntrip, Urbaser v.
Argentina: The Origins of a Host State Human Rights Counterclaim in ICSID Arbitration?, EJIL: Talk, https:/
/perma.cc/47UK-WG8T (Feb. 10, 2017).
251. See Kube & Petersmann, supra note 240, at 85–86. R
252. See id. at 87–91.
253. Nor is the human rights regime the only one with which investment treaties may intersect. See
Stone Sweet & Grisel, supra note 50, at 75 (noting potential linkages with trade and environmental R
protection). Developing the law here could pave the way to greater clarity in those other areas as well.
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Relatedly, the fact that human rights concerns are at stake makes the
importance of providing guidance that much greater. Clarity surrounding
the scope of substantive rights is always important to investors, for the sake
of business planning, and to host states, for the sake of planning their regu-
latory agenda. But when a regulatory issue involves human rights concerns,
it will often be even more urgent for host states to know whether invest-
ment treaty liability is a risk so that they can plan accordingly.254
Second, from the standpoint of accuracy concerns, this is not an area in
which further factual development is needed before some progress can be
made. In particular, the threshold question of whether human rights obliga-
tions should have any bearing on investment treaty liability is a pure legal
one that tribunals can begin debating immediately. If the answer to that
threshold question is yes, tribunals also need to work out the legal mecha-
nism by which human rights concerns should enter the analysis—as a de-
fense based on necessity or an exception provision,255 as a lens through
which to interpret the investor’s legitimate expectations,256 or some other
possibility not yet proposed. Further factual development would undoubt-
edly be useful before standards are developed to address questions such as
the weight human rights concerns should be afforded and what showing the
host state must make.257 But the point is that tribunals can make progress
on the less fact-intensive questions in the meantime.
Conclusion
The practice of precedent in ITA is here to stay, but if it is going to
produce the values that proponents expect, a more principled approach is
needed. This Article supplies the missing framework. It begins by outlining
three key values served by precedent, and then explains why achieving them
in the distinctive ITA context requires a different model from the common
law approach of stable, incremental decision making. The proposed alterna-
tive is a model of dialogue, in which tribunals actively question past deci-
sions and write their own decisions with an eye toward advancing the
broader debate. The ultimate goal is convergence on a common view that
can then serve as authoritative guidance, and the dialectic model facilitates
254. See Kube & Petersmann, supra note 240, at 68 (describing the regulatory chill concern in the R
context of human rights).
255. See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human Rights Issues into
International Investment Agreements, 49 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 670, 674–75 (2011).
256. See Urbaser SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, ¶ 624 (Dec. 8,
2016); see also Yannick Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from
Within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 1107, 1170–71 (2011)
(discussing how human rights concerns should be incorporated into the analysis of legitimate expecta-
tions and proportionality).
257. Commentators have begun proposing frameworks for these questions as well. See, e.g.,
Karamanian, supra note 246, at 435–36 (identifying four principles based on, for example, the source of R
the human right at issue).
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such convergence through a process that properly balances predictability,
accuracy, and legitimacy.
The proposed framework leaves a fair amount of discretion for tribunals to
decide how those values should be weighed in individual cases and thus does
not necessarily yield determinate answers. But to the extent it fosters a more
disciplined approach to precedent, it would still represent an improvement
over current, ad hoc practices. Moreover, even if tribunals do not follow the
proposed framework in all of its details, my more modest hope is that the
Article encourages them to think about precedent more systematically, ap-
plying past decisions and authoring new ones with an appreciation for the
larger dialogue in which they are participating.
